




A Survey of the Legal Issues
Encountered by Commercial Banks
In the world of international finance, corporations and governments may
require large amounts of money quickly and inexpensively for a wide variety
of purposes. Commercial banks have increasingly played a major role in
financing these public and private entities. Syndicates of banks may be
formed when corporate and sovereign borrowers wish to obtain a larger
credit than individual banks may legally lend, desire, or have the capacity to
lend. Commercial banks may syndicate many types of international financial
transactions. The most pervasive of these are syndicated loans, with term
loans the most common, and revolving and stand-by loans frequently used.
These syndicated loans are funded primarily in Eurocurrencies (i.e., cur-
rency deposited outside the country in which it is legal tender), though
domestic currencies may be used either separately, or in conjunction with
Eurocurrencies. Of lesser importance are syndications of bankers' accep-
tances, letters of credit and guarantees.
Often, in the course of a financial transaction, syndicated or otherwise,
the borrower will not be able to meet its debt obligations. A syndicate of
commercial banks may decide to reschedule or refinance these debt obliga-
tions, allowing the borrower to re-organize its financial circumstances and
restore its creditworthiness, instead of enforcing collection by whatever
means are available. This article surveys the legal problems commercial
banks encounter in syndicating and rescheduling international financial
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transactions. Attention will focus on the legal problems that exist between
lenders in the formation of a syndicate, and the legal problems that lenders
have with borrowers and which affect lenders inter se in the course of a
transaction, including the rescheduling of a debt in the event of default.
This article proceeds in the following manner. Part I considers the legal
issues that commercial banks may encounter in syndicating loan transac-
tions. Outlined in this chapter'are the three general methods of structuring
loan syndications, and the various rights and duties of lead or managing
banks in the formation of a syndicated loan, as well as the rights and duties of
an agent bank in its administration. Part II examines some of the more
important provisions of a syndicated loan agreement to determine the rights
and duties of various parties under the transaction. Discussed, inter alia, are
the basic types of syndicated loan agreements, the duties of an agent bank in
the administration of a loan, the rights of lenders vis-A-vis a borrower in the
event the borrower is unable to fulfill its obligations, the rights of lenders
inter se in the operation of a loan, and provisions dealing with conditions
precedent, representations and warranties, covenants, events of default,
selection of governing law and forum, waivers of sovereign immunity,
sharing clauses, waivers, and amendments of the loan agreement. Part III
considers the syndication of bankers' acceptances, using the analysis in the
earlier two parts as a framework from which to start. This part examines the
different types of bankers' acceptances and syndication methods, and the
mechanics of syndication methods. Part IV analyzes the rescheduling and
refinancing of syndicated transactions. Particular attention is given to the
mechanics of rescheduling and the legal provisions contained in reschedul-
ing agreements that govern the relationships between lenders and a problem
debtor, as well as those amongst the lenders.
I. Loan Syndications:
Duties and Rights of Banks
A. GENERAL SYNDICATION STRUCTURES
The duties and rights of the various banks in syndicated loan transactions
vary depending on the method by which a loan syndication is structured.
There are three basic structures of syndicated loan facilities.'
1. Direct Loan Syndicate
The direct loan syndicate is the first general structure. It is a multilateral
loan agreement in which all the lenders, having signed a single loan docu-
1. The simple idea of three general structures has been borrowed from L. Mitchell, Forming
a Bank Loan Syndicate, Kensington Institute, Washington, Project No. 99-26-07055, June
1980.
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ment, advance funds to the borrower pursuant to the conditions under the
agreement. Each bank has agreed to lend up to and receive payments
commensurate with its contractual commitment. The obligations of the
banks are several, and not joint, as each bank is expressly responsible for its
own obligations and not those of any other bank.2 A promissory note of the
borrower to evidence further the loan transaction may be held by each
syndicate member, depending on the practice of the lender. 3
The direct loan syndicate is organized, depending on the size of the credit,
by either a manager or a limited number of co-managers under the lead-
ership of a lead manager, or perhaps that of co-leaders. Typically, most
loans are led by one or two major banks which have been chosen by the
borrower on the basis of a close historical relationship, a policy of rotating
banks to develop relationships with other banks, or price and other
considerations.4 The lead bank is authorized by the borrower in a mandate
letter to arrange the credit. Often, when the credit is very large, the lead
bank forms a small management group of lenders called co-managers. These
co-managers assist in the arranging of the credit, and are chosen because
they are capable of funding a large portion of the loan and represent a good
geographical mix.5
Concurrent with the formation of a management group is the drafting of a
loan agreement by the legal counsel of the lead bank in a form acceptable to
both the borrower and the lenders. Many of these loan provisions are
subject to negotiation between the borrower and the lead bank, and are
analyzed in Part II, below. Moreover, it is also common practice for the lead
bank to prepare in conjunction with the borrower an information or place-
ment memorandum. The memorandum not only describes the loan transac-
tion, but also provides relevant financial and statistical data about the
borrower, the guarantor (if any), and the country of the borrower and
guarantor.
Once a management group has coalesced, the lead bank commits the
group to the borrower to syndicate the loan. The commitment varies accord-
ing to the size of the loan and the practice of the lenders. At an earlier time,
either partially underwritten or best efforts commitment were prevalent.
With the former commitment, the lead bank would commit the group to
fund a substantial portion of the loan, but not all the loan. With the latter
commitment, the lead bank would commit the group to use its best efforts to
place the loan in the market, with a commitment to advance its portion of
the loan only if the entire syndication is successful; otherwise, the borrower
2. P. WOOD, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, 273 (1980).
3. R. Slater, Syndicated Bank Loans, J. Bus. L., May 1982, pp. 190-91.
4. H. Terrell and M. Martinson, Arranging and Marketing Syndicated Eurocurrency Loans,
BANKERS MAGAZINE, Nov.-Dec. 1978, at 37, infra note 8, p. 15.
5. Id. at 36.
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will have to go elsewhere for funds, or redraft the terms and conditions of
the loan to correspond to the market. Today, the most common arrange-
ment is for the management group to commit itself to provide a fully
underwritten credit6 in which the entire amount of the loan is provided by the
group, irrespective of whether or not the group is successful in placing a
portion of the loan outside the management group.
The lead bank, often in conjunction with the management group, solicits
other banks (participating banks) to join the syndicate to lend whatever
portion of the loan the management group as a whole does not wish to fund
itself. In most cases, the participating banks are chosen by the lead bank,
though some banks with whom a borrower wants a banking relationship, or
who have earlier contacted the borrower, are asked. Usually the lead bank
will assemble a large preliminary list of potential participants, based on each
bank's participation in past syndications. The lead bank refines that list by
determining which banks are willing to lend to particular borrowers on
which terms, through its informal contacts in the market. 7 Those banks that
are asked to participate are solicited over the telex. The amount sought and
the terms and conditions of the loan are stated.8 Moreover, the participating
banks receive a copy not only of a draft loan agreement, but also of the
information memorandum though the lead bank is not required to provide
this latter document. With a fully underwritten syndication, the lead and
managing banks typically retain as much as one-half to two-thirds of the
commitments, with the remaining funds supplied by the participating banks.
The lead bank is expected to take a share that is at least as large as that of any
other bank in the management group, with 10 percent of the loan the
average. 9
Often, with smaller credits to well-known borrowers, the lead bank and
its management group will fund the entire loan. Only the terms of the
proposed transaction are communicated between banks because each bank,
through its own credit department, knows the financial, economic, and
political circumstances of the borrower well, rendering unnecessary in-
formation memoranda. These direct loan syndications are called "club
deals," 1 ° reflecting the ease at which a small group of closely knit banks can
organize funding for a smaller credit.
Once the loan agreement between the lead bank, manager, co-manager,
and participating banks and the borrower has been executed, an agent bank
is chosen to administer the loan, usually from the ranks of the syndicate
6. Id.
7. Id. at 37.
8. L. Goodman, Syndicated Eurocurrency Credits: Pricing and Practice 20, Research Paper
No. 8202 (Jan. 1982) (available at Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y.).
9. Supra note 4, at 37.
10. Supra note 8, at 22.
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members, with the lead bank most often chosen. The agent bank not only
disburses funds from the lenders to the borrower, but also collects payments
from the borrower and disburses them to the lenders. Moreover, the agent
bank monitors the financial behavior of the borrower to inform the syndi-
cate banks of any important changes in its financial condition.
2. Participation Syndicate
A second important general structure of loan syndication is the participa-
tion syndicate. Many banks may be involved in a participation syndicate, but
only a single bank, the lead bank, executes the loan agreement with the
borrower, having negotiated the proposed credit terms with the borrower,
and provided the funding from its own reserves. The lead bank will form the
syndicate by entering into a participation agreement with other banks,
usually, but not necessarily, after it has executed the loan agreement. The
presence of the other banks need not be generally disclosed to the borrower.
In effect, the lead bank under the participation agreement will sell to the
participating banks an undivided interest in its loan in consideration for
funds they will provide to the lead bank. Typically, these funds in turn are
used by the lead bank to fund the participants' part of the loan. The lead
bank agrees to pay to each participating bank receipts from the borrower
commensurate with the bank's participation." Although the participating
banks fund part or perhaps all of the loan, they are not co-lenders under the
loan agreement because the lead bank holds all the documents, including
the promissory note from the borrower. The participating banks hold only a
participation certificate from the syndicate leader to evidence their share of
the loan.
The participation syndicate enables the lead bank not to compromise its
particular business relationship with the borrower because the names of the
participating banks are not generally disclosed to the borrower. The lead
bank may be motivated to sell participations under the participation agree-
ment for the same reasons given for a lead manager forming a direct loan
syndicate, viz.: (1) the lead bank may wish to transfer to participating banks
part of the risk of a loan; (2) the lead bank may have inadequate funds to
finance the loan itself; and (3) the lead bank may be compelled by law or
internal guidelines to sell participations, having exceeded a lending ceiling
to a particular borrower. In the United States, for example, such ceilings
exist for individual borrowers.
The lead bank may grant a participation in several ways, having provided
prospective participating banks with an information memorandum or any
other written or oral communication about the borrower. The most promi-
11. Wood, supra note 2, at 273.
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nent methods of granting participations include assignments, sub-loans, and
undisclosed agency.' 2 Under an assignment, the lead bank may assign for a
purchase price either its rights under the loan agreement against the bor-
rower or only payments from the borrower when and if they are received pro
tanto commensurate with consideration given by the participating banks.
The purchase price is used by the lead bank to fund the loan. Under a
sub-loan, a participating bank makes a loan directly to the lead bank. The
repayment of the loan is solely contingent upon the lead bank receiving
payments from the borrower and is secured by the participating bank with
an assignment of proceeds. With undisclosed agency, the lead bank forms
the syndicate before the execution of the loan agreement, acting as the agent
on behalf of the syndicate, but without disclosing this agency relationship to
the borrower. The lead bank is liable for all obligations toward the borrower
under the loan agreement, especially if the loan agreement expressly or by
implication claims that it applies to the stated parties therein. The lead bank
can neither claim that it is merely an agent nor have a participant intervene
as a principal, a serious disadvantage in the event, for instance that any one
of the participating banks were in default of advancing funds during the
drawdown of the loan to the borrower.
The lead bank in a participation syndicate administers the loan in much
the same way as the agent bank in the direct loan syndication. Its rights and
duties are delineated in the participation agreement with the participating
banks.
3. Direct Loan/Participation Syndicate
The third general method of structuring a loan syndication combines the
central characteristics of the first two structures discussed above. A lead
manager or co-lead managers receive a mandate and form a direct loan
syndicate involving many banks, any one of which, after the execution of the
loan agreement, may, and often will, sell a partial undivided interest in its
stated commitment to participant banks.
An agent bank is appointed to administer the loan agreement, with the
lead bank typically being chosen to serve as the agent bank. The agent bank
has duties to the banks who financed the loan agreement before its execu-
tion. It may have duties to the participating banks if any one of the banks
which participated out a portion of its loans, for instance, makes an assign-
ment of its payments from the borrower to the agent bank, which in turn
distributes payments to the participating banks (typically on a pro rata
basis).
12. Wood, supra note 2, at 274.
VOL. 18, NO. 4
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 875
4. Current Syndication Practice
The choice of the general structure of loan syndications depends on
several considerations, including, perhaps most importantly the ability of
the lead bank to source, structure, and sell the loan and its past syndication
practices. The direct loan syndicate has been favored by large U.S. money
center banks, and by large and well-positioned European banks. 13 Large
direct loan syndications are often facilitated by consortium banks, i.e.,
banks that are owned by large international banks and which can commit
their own funds and those of their shareholders.
The participation syndicate has been favored by a majority of commercial
banks in the United States. 14 Its usage in international finance has arisen
from their domestic lending practices, the potential for the lead bank to gain
prestige and influence, and management fees by acting as the sole lender to
the borrower, and the flexibility afforded after the signing of the loan
agreement in shifting risks and enhancing liquidity. Consortium banks also
facilitate this type of structure because the major shareholders may pur-
chase large portions of the loan after the execution of the loan agreement.
The direct loan/participation syndicate has been used more frequently
during the past ten years by U.S. money center banks, regional banks, and
by smaller banks. This structure enables smaller banks and regional banks
not only to gain the prestige and earn the management fees associated with a
very large direct loan syndication, but also to participate out a portion of the
stated loan commitment.
B. DUTIES AND RIGHTS OF LEAD BANKS
AND MANAGERS
The duties and rights of lead banks and managers under participation and
direct loan syndications are in many respects, similar under both syndication
structures. It is assumed for expositional convenience in the discussion to
follow, therefore, that the rights and duties of lead managers will also be
those of lead banks, unless otherwise indicated.
1. Sourcing and Structuring the Loan
To arrange a syndication, a lead manager must secure a mandate letter
from the borrower which authorizes the manager to arrange the loan accord-
ing to its terms. In order to obtain such a mandate, a prospective lead
manager makes a feasible offer to the borrower, having taken into consid-
eration the current market conditions and needs of the borrower. The offer
13. Supra note 1, at 2.
14. Id.
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outlines not only the financial terms such as the amount and maturity of the
loan, the interest rate, the availability of the loan facility, the fees of the
syndicate leader, but also, in summary form, other important clauses that
have been standardized in loan agreements, most of which are conditions
the bank wishes to impose to protect itself, e.g., events of default, waiver of
sovereign immunity.
The legal status of the offer letter is subject to some uncertainty. If it is
intended to be a purely commercial proposal binding in honor, and without
the force of a legal commitment, the letter must state in unambiguous terms
that it does not create legally binding obligations. Often managers can
escape the presumption that an offer letter is a commercial document that is
legally binding if accepted by the borrower with the words "subject to
contract." 15 Otherwise, the offer-subject to its expiry-is open to accep-
tance by the bank, though many of the conditions of the offer will be subject
to negotiation and subsequent amendment.
In the offer letter, a lead manager will commit himself to either a best
efforts, or a partially or fully underwritten commitment. 16 A best efforts
commitment is legally binding only to the extent that the lead manager must
offer the loan to the market under a certain set of terms and conditions. If
the commitment is to partially underwrite the amount of the loan, the
amount not underwritten typically is syndicated on a best efforts basis. In
the event of a fully underwritten commitment, a lead manager should make
clear to the borrower that the borrower's commitment entails a legally
binding obligation that at the time of signing, the banks in the syndicate
commit the full amount of the loan. Once this commitment has been met,
the borrower, and not the bank is entitled to the protection of the loan
agreement. A lead bank in its offer letter will make a firm commitment to
fully underwrite the loan, though it may include the right to participate the
loan out at a later date.
17
2. Selling the Loan
Once a mandate has been obtained from the borrower, the lead manager
attempts to place the loan with other financial institutions. Even though the
practices of soliciting commitments under the syndication structures differ
in some respects, principal of which is the solicitation of banks before and
after the execution of the loan agreement, the duties and rights of the lead
manager and lead bank vis-A-vis other financial institutions during the
selling of the loan do not vary markedly. In a direct loan syndication, a lead
15. Wood, supra note 2, at 256-57.
16. See supra text accompanying note 6.
17. BEE, Syndication, OFFSHORE LENDING BY U.S. COMMERCIAL BANKS, Bankers Association
for Foreign Trade, 160 (1975).
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manager is responsible for preparing and distributing to other banks two or
three documents when placing a loan. First, a "term sheet" describing the
basic terms of the proposed financing, is prepared and distributed by telex to
prospective banks. Second, usually accompanying the term sheet is an
information memorandum-a document that presents, in addition to or in
lieu of any other written or oral communication, relevant information about
the borrower's financial, political and economic circumstances. This
memorandum is prepared in conjunction with the borrower, using informa-
tion which is .submitted by the borrower and which often is modified by the
lead manager. Third, the lead manager prepares a draft loan agreement
which is distributed to financial institutions somewhat later than the term
sheet and information memorandum if any.
In a participation syndicate, the lead bank distributes only a copy of the
executed loan agreement, and perhaps a copy of a document resembling an
information memorandum, in lieu of, or in addition to, any other written or
oral communication of the lead bank to prospective participants. The in-
formation memorandum may be compiled from relevant information sup-
plied by the borrower to the lead bank for its own credit assessment, but
typically is not prepared in conjunction with the borrower, given the very
nature of the participation agreement which enables the lead bank to sell
participations without the borrower's knowledge.
The lead manager, under a direct loan syndication and the lead bank,
under a participation syndicate, may have duties to prospective syndicate
members regarding not only the information memorandum, but also the
credit documentation. Those duties are discussed below.
a. Information Memorandum
In preparing and distributing information memoranda, a lead bank man-
ager may be responsible for any statements that are incorrect or incomplete.
In deciding whether to participate in a syndicate, prospective syndicate
members may rely upon the lead manager to state accurately the borrower's
requirements and financial, political and economic circumstances. Even
though the lead manager may expect that each bank leader will conduct its
own credit assessment of the borrower without relying on the lead manager,
the lead manager may nonetheless be liable for any omission or misrepre-
sentation of material fact. Liability may stem not only from the securities
legislation of the jurisdiction in which the memorandum is distributed, but
also from non-statutory duties that may be imposed by common and civil
law.
i. Securities Legislation. The information memorandum of the lead man-
ager will be covered by the securities legislation of various countries in which
that memorandum is distributed if the underlying loan transaction can be
characterized as a security for purposes of the legislation. Unless there is an
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exemption, the lead manager may be subject to strenuous registration
requirements, requiring a duty of accurate disclosure, the breach of which
would invite onerous liabilities for misrepresentation. In this section, I shall
briefly review the securities legislation of the United Kingdom, the United
States, and Canada respectively.
(a) United Kingdom-An. information memorandum is regulated by
securities legislation in the United Kingdom, though the managing bank can
evade liability for a misrepresentation through an applicable exemption.
Under the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act of 1958, participations in
a loan agreement would be characterized as a specified investment trans-
action, the result of which is the prohibition of an information
memorandum.' 8 An exemption may exist, however. If, for instance, the
memorandum is issued by exempt dealers, a category which covers most
banks, or is issued on behalf of a government or statutory corporation,' 9 the
information memorandum would not be prohibited.
Moreover, under the Companies Act 1948, as amended, the characteriza-
tion of a promissory note evidencing a loan agreement as a debenture of a
company, whether foreign or domestic, will result in the inclusion of spec-
ified information in an information memorandum. 20 Exemptions exist if, for
instance, the distribution of the memorandum accompanies a private place-
ment or, in the event the borrower is a foreign company, the memorandum
is distributed to professional dealers in securities.2 '
(b) United States-In the United States, the law is still somewhat unset-
tled as to whether securities legislation applies to promissory notes and
participation agreements under a .loan transaction. Recent authority,
however, suggests that notes and participation agreements issued in connec-
tion with commercial bank loans are not securities.22 As a result, lead
managers may be relieved from complying with the disclosure requirements
that would otherwise apply to information memoranda, or, for that matter,
any other oral or written communication, and being liable for any omissions
or misstatements of material facts contained therein. However, lead man-
agers should try to comply with these requirements in the event courts may
rule that various aspects of loan syndications are subject to securities legisla-
tion. It will be worthwhile at this juncture to consider the manner in which
securities legislation has applied to loan syndications.
The earlier confusion arose from whether or not the syndication of a loan
that involved either a promissory note or participation agreement could be
characterized as a security agreement so as to trigger the registration provi-
18. Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act, 1958 (U.K.), 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c.45.
19. Wood, supra note 2, at 258.
20. Companies Act, 1948 (U.K.) c.38, as am.
21. Wood, supra note 2, at 258.
22. CLARK and FARRAR, Rights and Duties of Managing and Agent Banks in Syndicated Loans
to Government Borrowers, U. ILL. L. REV. 236 (1982).
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characterized as a security agreement so as to trigger the registration provi-
sion of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) 23 and the anti-fraud
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).24 A
literal interpretation of the definition of security in the Securities Act
suggests that loan syndication would be caught "unless the context already
requires." 25 Indeed, some courts were willing to apply a literal reading when
dealing with notes evidencing a grant of a participation. For instance, the
court in Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central National Bank ,26 a case where a
promissory note evidencing the sale of a loan participation, held that almost
all notes have been construed by the courts as defined by securities legisla-
tion. This literal reading suggests that loan participation offerings might be
subject to registration requirements or due diligence standards as to com-
pleteness and veracity.
Other courts, however, have applied different types of tests,27 none of
which were entirely satisfactory. An investment-commercial test was ap-
plied to determine whether a security existed under either Act. 28 The courts
reasoned that if a promissory note or participation agreement represents an
investment, it is a security under both Acts. If it is not a security, then it is a
commercial loan, and will not be caught by the Acts. The courts considered
many factors structuring a loan transaction when applying the test. The test
was rendered uncertain when it was found that each case should be decided
on its own merits. A risk-capital test was considered. 29 The risk in a loan
transaction was the prospect that the loan would not be paid. This test was
rendered uncertain due to problems in evaluating risk. A "purpose" or
"resemblance" test30 created the presumption that any note or participation
that was literally within the definition of security of either Act would be a
security, unless the party claiming the converse could demonstrate that no
purpose could be served by applying the Act. An "investment contract" test
was also used to determine whether a participation in the note granted by a
lead bank, or a noteless participation syndicate agreement, could be char-
acterized as a security. This test, formulated in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. ,31
defined an investment contract to be: (1) the investment money; (2) in a
common enterprise; (3) with an expectation of profit; (4) solely from the
23. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1982).
24. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-78kk (1982).
25. Securities Act § 2(1). The definition of security in the Exchange Act is very much the
same § 3(a)10, 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(10)(1976).
26. 409 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969).
27. For a brief discussion of these tests, which this article follows, see Ryan, International
Bank Loan Syndication and Participations, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW, LENDING, CAPITAL
TRANSFERS AND INSTITUTIONS 30 (R. Rendell ed. 1980).
28. See e.g., C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir.)
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); or, Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3rd Cir. 1973).
29. See e.g., Amfac Mtg. Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1978).
30. Exchange National Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976).
31. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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efforts of others. A later decision de-emphasized the fourth element, thus
creating a broader test; the Hawaii32 test looked to whether the participant
could exercise practical and actual control over the managerial decision of
the enterprise.
If the note or participation could be characterized as a security, its
issuance by a lead manager or lead bank may be subject to not only the
disclosure requirements under the registration provision of the Securities
Act, but also the disclosure requirements under the anti-fraud provisions of
the Securities and Exchange Acts, unless a relevant exemption were to
apply. With respect to the disclosure requirements, a lead manager could
avail itself of a private placement exemption if it had taken measures to
ensure that its syndication of the loan was without general solicitation or
advertising, did not involve a public distribution and involved a small
number of sophisticated offerees in financial and business dealings, each of
which had been furnished or could gain access to sufficient and accurate
information concerning the borrower.33 The preparaton and distribution of
an information memorandum by the lead manager to prospective banks,
though not legally required, could qualify the syndication as having satisfied
the informational requirements of the private placement exemption, even
though the offerees may not have the necessary relationship with the bor-
rower to have effective access to the relevant information to make an
informed decision about joining the syndication. Conversely, if prospective
bank lenders have effective access to relevant information, the informa-
tional requirement of the private placement exemption will be satisfied
without the information memorandum.
Syndications exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities
Act may nevertheless fall within the anti-fraud provision of the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act, imposing a duty of due diligence upon the lead
manager, if the information memorandum or, for that matter, any other oral
or written communication by the manager to prospective lending banks,
either omitted or made misstatements about material facts. Even though
liability for a defective information memorandum will primarily attach to
the borrower, a lending bank can and will look to the lead manager if the
borrower is insolvent, and the lead manager knew, or in the exercise of due
diligence should have known, of such misstatements or omissions. 34
(c) Canada-Securities legislation in Canada may apply to a syndication
involving Canadian banks as prospective lenders, or as prospective lead
managers, but for exemptions contained in various provincial securities
legislation. In Ontario, for instance, where many of Canada's banks have
their headquarters, the Ontario Securities Act (OSA) would apply to syn-
dications involving a note or participation agreement and would require
32. State of Hawaii v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
33. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
34. Colocotronif Tanker Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 998 (J.P.M. 1976).
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disclosure if a literal reading of the definition of a security is made. 35 This
applies to information memoranda supplied in Ontario by domestic as well
as foreign lead banks.
Exemptions are available, however, from disclosure requirements if:
1) in the event the Canadian bank qua principal purchaser is a bank to
which the Bank Act (Canada) applies; 36 and 2) in the event the Canadian
bank qua lead manager either a) solicits not more than fifty prospective
lending banks resulting in sales to no more than twenty-five purchasers,
giving rise to a private placement exemption, 37 or b) places a security with a
prospective lending bank if the aggregate acquisition exceeds more than
$97,000.38
The private placement and $97,000 exemptions are not available to Cana-
dian lead managers if information memoranda without a description of a
contractual right of action are distributed to prospective lending banks. In
the event of a misrepresentation contained in the information memorandum
upon which lending banks rely in making a decision to join the loan syndica-
tion, the lending banks may either rescind their involvement in the syndica-
tion or seek damages against the borrower and the lead manager. 39 The lead
manager is not responsible for damages with respect to a misrepresentation
in the information memorandum, unless it knew of the misrepresentation or
failed to conduct a reasonable investigation so as to provide reasonable
grounds for a belief that there had been no misrepresentation.4 °
Under the 1980 Bank Act, a Canadian bank is permitted to act in concert
with a consortium of lending or financing institutions to effect a loan not-
withstanding that it may result in a private placement, so long as at least
one-half of the loan is advanced by the syndicate, which may include foreign
banks.4'
ii. Non-Statutory Duties Regarding Disclosure. There may exist a non-
statutory duty to disclose in addition to, or in lieu of, disclosure require-
ments of securities legislation, based on concepts of fraudulent or negligent
misrepresentation. For instance, a lead manager may be subject to civil and
criminal liability if it knew that a statement in an information memorandum
was incorrect, or was reckless as to whether or not it was true, irrespective of
whether the lead bank distributed the memorandum in its own name or as an
agent of the borrower.42
In the event negligence is alleged by a lending bank, a claim for damages
35. O.S.A. s. 1(1)(40)(v).
36. O.S.A. s. 71(1)(a)(i).
37. O.S.A. s. 71(l)(p).
38. O.S.A. s. 71(1)(d).
39. O.S.A. Regulation 21.
40. O.S.A. s. 126(4).
41. Banks and Banking Law Revisions Act, Chap. 40, 1980-81, § 190(5).
42. Wood, supra note 2, at 259.
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may be based on a theory such as that involved in Hedley Byrne Co. Ltd. v.
Heller & Partners Ltd.43 Whether liability will attach to the lead manager for
a breach of duty of care depends on several factors under that approach,
including the extent of the manager's involvement in preparing the informa-
tion memorandum and the extent to which the lending bank relied on the
memorandum in lieu of not having access to other relevant information
about the borrower. The greater the reliance of the lending bank for
information the leading manager knows the former bank cannot secure
anywhere else, the more likely a duty of care is owed to the lending bank by
the lead manager.44
Liability steming from the breach of these non-statutory duties may
depend on the choice-of-law clause in the loan agreement, because of the
typically broad geographic mix of lending banks. In the event the choice-of-
law clause does not govern, the choice-of-forum clause in the loan agree-
ment might dictate which law will be relevant through the application of the
conflict rules of the forum.4 5
iii. Limiting the Manager's Liability for Information Memoranda.
(a) Due Diligence Defense-The lead manager should satisfy itself that it
has at least met the due diligence investigation standards specified by the
securities legislation of the countries in which it distributes the memoran-
dum, and each manager in a management group should review the memo-
randum with the same standard of due diligence as if it were alone responsi-
ble for its preparation.46 Meeting these standards will probably preclude the
application of non-statutory duties which exist in addition to, and in lieu of,
the statutory duties, if any, prescribed by the securities legislation. The lead
manager might review information not only with the borrower but also with
either experts of the manager or independent analysts and experts. Sources
of information should be official and verifiable, and wherever possible,
sources should be asked to confirm in writing that the information is true.47
Statements of opinion by the borrower should clearly be labelled and never
asserted as facts. In addition, forecasts of the borrower should state its
underlying assumptions48 and methodologies. The lead manager might
further reduce its duty to disclose information by distributing the memoran-
dum only to banks that have as much information about the borrower as the
lead manager.
In the event a change occurs in the borrower's circumstances between the
43. (1964) A.C. 465.
44. White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
45. Clark and Farrar, supra note 22, at 237.
46. Supra, note 2, at 261.
47. Supra note 27, at 30.
48. Wood, supra note 2, at 262.
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distribution of the memorandum and the execution of the loan agreement
that would render incorrect an otherwise correct information memoran-
dum, the lead manager should notify prospective lenders of the change, lest
a failure to make a subsequent correction be construed by the courts as a
fraudulent misrepresentation.
(b) Conflicting Duties of Disclosure-A lead manager may have con-
flicting duties of disclosure, having obtained information about the bor-
rower from another source on a confidential basis, but yet having a duty to
disclose such information to prospective bank lenders. The conflict may be
resolved depending on the type and relevance of the information. If the
information is non-material, the leading manager will not have a duty of
disclosure to prospective lending banks. But if the information is material,
the lead manager may ask the borrower to either disclose the information
itself, or permit the manager to do so. In any event, the disclosure need not
be contained within the information memorandum because it could be made
through various media, including a separate letter, a syndicate meeting, or
through the manager's counsel . 49 The disclosure should of course take place
before the execution of the loan agreement, and presumably allow prospec-
tive lending banks enough time to incorporate erstwhile unknown material
information in its decision-making. In the event the borrower does not
permit the material information to be disclosed, the manager should, with
the borrower's permission, notify the prospective lending banks that some
material information regarded as confidential by the borrower has not been
disclosed, and that each lending bank should rely on its own information
when making decisions. 50 A lead manager may have to relieve itself of its
lead position in extreme circumstances. 5'
(c) Conflicts of Interest-A lead manager may also have conflicts of
interest that it should disclose. Its interest in other loans to the borrower in
the capacity of either lender, agent, trustee or affiliate of other lenders
should be disclosed to prospective lending banks, as well as the management
fee it is to receive in leading the syndication of the loan.
52
(d) Exculpatory Disclaimers-A lead manager may attempt to use ex-
culpatory clauses in either the information memorandum or the loan agree-
ment to shield itself from memorandum misrepresentations that are action-
able under statutory, criminal and civil provisions. The usefulness of these
clauses depends on the jurisdiction and the circumstances. For instance, it is
generally against public policy in many jurisdictions to use exculpatory
provisions, for fear that (1) a party in a superior bargaining position may
make itself immune from liability for any misrepresentation, even the most
49. Ryan, supra note 27, at 31.
50. Id.
51. Wood, supra note 2, at 262.
52. Wood, supra note 2, at 263.
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flagrant, such as fraudulent misrepresentation, and (2) a party who bar-
gains with an equal may impose a disclaimer that does not crystallize the
risks borne by the two parties. Since banks in a syndication are not unequal
at least with respect to public information about sovereign borrowers, an
exculpatory disclaimer should not be void, unless it has not been specific
enough to properly apprise prospective bank lenders of the risks allocated to
them. 3
A lead manager might use certain contractual techniques to evade liability
for a defective misrepresentation. First, the lead manager may have each
lender in the syndicate confirm that it had not relied upon the manager for
the accuracy and completeness of the information memorandum or any
other oral or written communications regarding the material circumstances
of the borrower. The exclusion of reliance denies to the lending bank the
premise that it had been induced by the misrepresentation to enter into the
transaction.5 4 Second, the lead manager may try to transform itself from a
lesser or greater co-principal to a mere agent of the borrower in terms of the
preparation and distribution of the information memorandum. 55 In order to
reduce as much as possible its own responsibility in the preparation of the
information memorandum, and emphasize that of the borrower, the lead
manager should obtain a written statement from the borrower which is to be
included in the information memorandum stating, among other things, that:
(1) the borrower not only claims the information is true and complete, but
also assumes responsibility for the information; and (2) the memorandum
was prepared and distributed on behalf of the borrower by the lead
manager. 56 And finally, the lead manager may obtain an indemnity from the
borrower in the event an action for a misrepresentation involves the lead
manager.
b. Loan Agreement Negotiation
After the distribution of the information memorandum, but before the
execution of the loan agreement, prospective lending banks receive a copy
of the draft loan agreement. The principal purpose of this exercise is to
solicit comments from prospective lending banks about the loan documenta-
tion. Often the time pressures of funding a loan subject to the terms and
conditions of the lead manager's mandate letter in a rapidly changing
market preclude much meaningful discourse between prospective lending
banks and the lead manager because the lending banks will have to commit
themselves to the syndication before knowing the outcome of their com-
ments. This may not be a problem because the lending banks will have relied
53. Ryan, supra note 27, at 31.
54. Wood, supra note 2, at 201.
55. Wood, supra note 2, at 261.
56. Ryan, supra note 27, at 40.
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on the statements in the term sheet that the loan agreement will contain the
standard provisions. This fact should not give rise to much concern since the
documentation of syndicated loans is extremely standardized compared to
that of the other financial transactions. 57 But in the event the lead manager
and borrower make substantial changes in the draft loan documentation,
providing inadequate protection to the lending banks, the issue of legal
liability attaching to the lead manager arises.
The legal status of the claim of a lending bank will depend on the
circumstances. In order to prove its claim for damages, a lending bank must
satisfy the burden not only that the lead manager was negligent in negotiat-
ing the loan documentation with the borrower, but that its negligence
caused a loss. The lead manager may claim as a defense that the draft loan
agreement contained the standard exculpatory disclaimers with respect to
its responsibility for the execution, collectability and sufficiency of the loan,
among other things. Moreover, the lead manager may assert that the com-
mitment of the lending bank to the syndicate without adequate documenta-
tion gives rise to a form of contributory negligence or estoppel denying any
form of recovery.
The lead manager may seek to avoid liability in several ways, the most
important of which are: (1) employ independent legal counsel, not its own
counsel, to prepare and negotiate the documentation; (2) advise the lend-
ing banks to seek independent legal advice; (3) insert an exculpatory dis-
claimer; and, of course, (4) enable the lending banks to have adequate time
to review and discuss with the lead manager the loan documentation.
58
3. After the Execution of the Loan Agreement
The lead manager's responsibility to other banks usually ends with the
signing of the loan agreement. The lead manager may undertake further
responsibility to the syndicate, but in another capacity, that of agent, the
duties and rights of which are discussed immediately below. Moreover, the
leading manager may voluntarily assume the role of negotiator in reschedul-
ing the loan agreement and inadvertently incur further liability which is
discussed in Part IV, below.
C. DUTIES AND RIGHTS OF AGENT BANKS
Since the duties and rights of agent banks under participations and direct
loan syndications are very similar, it may be assumed that the term 'agent
bank' applies to both syndications unless an explicit differentiation between
the two is made. Moreover, it may be further assumed that the agent bank
57. Clarke and Farrar, supra note 22, at 240.
58. Wood, supra note 2, at 263.
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was the lead manager under a direct loan syndication, and the lead bank
under a participation syndication.
1. Duties Owed by Agent Bank
The agent bank owes to syndicate members the explicit duties to adminis-
ter the contract as set out under the credit or participation agreement as the
case may be. It may also owe implied duties, which exist outside the
agreement and are imposed by the general law of agency of the country in
which the agent bank is located. Agency agreements usually have language
that precludes the application of these implied duties. While it is certainly
advisable that the agent use such provisions to limit the scope of its duties,
the agent should nonetheless consider these implied duties and discharge
these burdens whenever possible. It is necessary at this juncture to consider
what these implied duties may entail before looking at the often mechanical
duties expressly stated in the contract.
2. Implied Duties
a. Scope of Implied Duties
The greatest implied duties of the agent bank will be those of a fiduciary,
requiring the agent to act as a trustee on behalf of the syndicate banks.
Lesser implied duties may also exist, subjecting the agent bank to duties not
as rigorous as those borne by a fiduciary. An agent bank may have several
fiduciary duties. The most important duty would be one of care and due
diligence in the manner in which the agent would owe a duty to the lending
banks to act with at least that degree of care and skill which the bank would
exercise for its own account, unless a different standard is otherwise agreed
upon. 59 This duty of care and due diligence far exceeds standard contractual
duties in a syndication agreement, which hold the agent bank liable for only
"gross negligence and wilful misconduct". The ambit of this duty covers at
least the mechanical aspects of administering a syndicated loan such as
keeping and rendering an account of money the agent bank has received or
disbursed on behalf of the lending banks, and disclosing any significant
remuneration for its services. Another fiduciary duty is for the agent bank
neither to make secret profits out of its agency relationship nor to sub-
delegate its authority to administer the loan.
In addition, an agent bank as a fiduciary owes its principals a duty not to
allow its responsibility as agent to conflict with the interests it may have
stemming from several ofher capacities, all of which involve the borrower.
Examples of other capacities in which an agent might be engaged that give
rise to conflicts of interest include: (1) the agent might be a lending member
of the syndicate or of another syndicate, having its own separate interests as
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 (1958).
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a bank; (2) the agent might be another agent under other credits to the
borrower or its affiliates; (3) the agent might be a trustee for security
holders of the borrower or its affiliates; 60 and (4) the agent might have
cross-share holdings or cross-directorships with the borrower or its
affiliates. 6 ' Since these conflicts of interest are often difficult to resolve, the
agent bank may be held to much higher standards of due diligence because
of the presumption that it had not acted in as objective and disinterested
manner as it might have in administering the syndicated credit.
62
An agent bank may try to reduce the conflicts inherent in acting in
different capacities by using several techniques. Most common is for the
agent bank to make complete and correct disclosure of these conflicts of
interest to syndicate banks, and to obtain their consent thereto.63 Disclosure
most commonly occurs prior to the nomination of the agent, a step which
precedes the commitment of prospective lending banks to the syndicated
credit, but may also occur subsequent to the signing in the event the agent
undertakes another capacity with respect to the borrower. In addition, the
agent bank may resort to various exculpatory clauses, which are discussed in
the immediately following section. Finally, in the event the credit encoun-
ters serious difficulties which put the agent at odds with itself in several
capacities, the agent may exercise the successor agent provisions in the
credit agreement, 64 though in practice syndicates are often reluctant to let
an agent go because it is difficult to find an independent bank. The syndi-
cate's refusal of the agent's resignation would give rise to a defense of
estoppel were liability to attach itself to the agent's irreconcilable conflicts.
Finally, an agent bank as a fiduciary may owe a duty to disclose all
material information arising out of its agency to its principals, unless it was
bound by a superior duty to a third person. This material information would
include advising lending banks about all relevant inside information
obtained by the agent after the signing of the loan agreement. This duty
would probably include notification of any breach of the conditions specified
under the loan agreement. It may also include a duty to disclose confidential
information acquired by the agent in some other capacity with the borrower.
However, the duty to the borrower not to disclose confidential information
will give rise under the agency agreement to conflicting duties of disclosure.
The agent can always ask the borrower to disclose the confidential informa-
tion through appropriate, and often informal, media to prospective bank
lenders. Moreover, the agent could, with the borrower's permission, notify
bank lenders that it has confidential information of the borrower acquired in
60. Ryan, supra note 27, at 35.
61. Wood, supra note 2, at 269.
62. Id.
63. Ryan, supra note 27, at 35.
64. Ryan, supra note 27, at 36.
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a different capacity which it cannot disclose. Unless the syndicate banks
agree to this nondisclosure of information due to a superior duty of confi-
dence, the agent bank may have no other recourse in resolving its conflict
but that of resigning its role as agent.65 It is unlikely this will happen for the
reasons cited above, thus protecting the agent from liability for losses caused
by this conflict through estoppel.
b. Exculpatory Disclaimers
It is in the obvious interest of the agent to contractually preclude as many
fiduciary duties as possible with the syndicate banks. Several such clauses
have been incorporated into loan or participation agreements, including:
(1) restricting the duties of the agent to only those powers and duties
expressed in the agreement and those reasonably incidental thereto;
66
(2) inserting general immunities which state that the agent is not liable for
any default or omission unless in the case of gross negligence or wilful
misconduct; 67 (3) providing that the agent is not a fiduciary, a tactic taken
to its semantic extreme by referring to the agent as the "administrative" or
"servicing" bank; 68 (4) providing specific immunities which absolve the
agent of several prospective areas of liability, including, for example,
(a) the reliance on documents it believes genuine, or the advice and state-
ments of legal counsel, independent consultants, and experts (b) non-
disclosure of confidential information acquired in another capacity and
(c) not relinquishing its other capacities with the borrower and its
affiliation; 69 (5) vesting powers and duties in the banks individually so as to
limit their reliance on the agent; 70 and (6) including of language to the
effect that the agent in including exculpatory provisions is merely protecting
itself in the event such duties may be (erroneously) imposed by an (unso-
phisticated) court, and is not contractually precluding a lending bank from
asserting fiduciary duties it may have otherwise owed to it by the agent.
The success of exculpatory clauses depends very much on legislative and
judicial policy. Judicial policy thus far has been to construe these provisions
narrowly against the person relying on them. Any ambiguity in language
which does not put the plaintiff on proper notice of the risks allocated to him
will be resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Legislative policy in England, for
example, denies the efficacy of exculpatory clauses, unless the court finds
them fair and reasonable.71
65. Ryan, supra note 27, at 35.
66. Wood, supra note 2, at 236.
67. Id.
68. Clarke and Farrar, supra note 22, at 244.
69. Wood, supra note 2, at 269-270.
70. Wood, supra note 2, at 270.
71. Id.
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3. Express Duties
An agent bank has many express duties which are set out in the contract.
For the most part, these duties are mechanical, requiring very little or no
discretion. Usually, discretion is limited to handling payments and docu-
ments, performing other mechanical matters, and, in the event of a default,
enforcing provisions of the loan agreement on behalf of the syndicate.72
The restriction of discretion, converting the agent bank into a mere device
to simplify the administrative burdens associated with the collection and
disbursement of payments, often reflects mutual intentions. The agent
desires less discretion, limiting its liability in a potentially troubled credit.
Other banks, at least those in a direct loan syndication, desire to limit an
agent's discretion in order to prevent the agent from developing a more
substantial business relationship with the borrower.
The discretion of the agent however need not always be limited to mecha-
nical duties. In a participation syndication, the lead bank often desires a
broad discretion to administer and modify the terms of its credit without the
consent of the lending banks. Moreover, in a direct loan syndication, it is
often in the best interests of the agent and lending banks alike for the agent
bank to have, and exercise, discretion, for instance, in bringing a lawsuit on
behalf of the lending banks. 73 A discretionary power is typically granted by
the delegation of duties and powers according to the terms of a loan
agreement, including such other powers as are "reasonably incidental
thereto." 74 These contractual discretionary powers are not expressly stated,
except to the extent that the agent will be indemnified for expenses and
losses incurred. It is the intention of the agent, and perhaps the lending
banks, moreover, that these discretionary powers neither be co-extensive
with nor be governed by fiduciary duties.
Four major mechanical duties are described below.
a. Disbursement and Collection of Funds
The agent bank acts as a disbursement and collection device for payments
to and from the borrower and lending banks, respectively. The lending
banks make their contribution available to an account in the name of the
agent upon being given a reasonable notice by the agent that the borrower
wishes to make a drawdown according to the terms of the loan agreement.
On the date of the drawdown, the agent deposits the funds in the borrower's
account, recording the funds received from the member banks. The agent
bank is responsible for calculating the interest rates that will apply to the
funds that will be disbursed. The price of money will be as provided in the
72. Ryan, supra note 27, at 34.
73. Ryan, supra note 27, at 36.
74. Emphasis mine.
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loan agreement (usually at the rates at which reference banks designated in
the loan agreement attract funds or make loans). Payments by the borrower
on a repayment date are made to an agent's account. The agent promptly
disburses payments received from the borrower commensurate with the
lending banks' outstanding participations. Agent banks may often disburse
more funds to a borrower on a drawdown and to syndicate banks on a
repayment than what was received. The agent is not responsible for the
shortfall as contemporary loan agreements contain claw-back clauses which
enable the agent to be indemnified by the party responsible for the
shortfall. 7
b. Verifying Conditions Precedent
An agent bank is not permitted to make a disbursement of funds to the
borrower on the initial drawdown until conditions precedent to the lending
banks' obligations to provide funds have been satisfied. The agent bank is to
receive all documentation pertinent to the proper execution of the loan
agreement, including guarantees, security and legal opinions. The agent
bank could determine whether or not the documentation conforms to the
loan agreement, but it may incur potential liability for a negligent legal
opinion supplied by its in-house counsel. The agent bank can shift what
otherwise would be a serious legal risk by awaiting and entirely relying upon
the legal opinion of the syndicate members, or independent legal counsel,
having furnished the documentation of these respective parties.
c. Monitoring the Financial Condition of the Borrower
Usually the members in a direct loan syndication are responsible for
monitoring the financial condition of the borrower. In the event the agent
bank is empowered to do so, the agent's discretion may be reduced if the
loan agreement confers an independent power upon each bank to call for
information through the agent.76
d. Default Notification
An agent bank is instructed by the loan agreement to notify the lenders of
an event of default. Its discretion is limited in two ways. First, loan agree-
ments contain provisions specifying when an agent is deemed to have notice
or knowledge of an event of default. Hence, an agent's deliberations over
whether the syndicate should be notified of a minor or inadvertent default
incurs the risk of liability for acting contrary to the agent's express duties.
Second, once the agent has notified the syndicate members, it has the
limited discretion of acting in the best interests of the syndication until
75. Wood, supra note 2, at 265-66.
76. Wood, supra note 2, at 266.
VOL. 18, NO. 4
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 891
instructions are received from the syndication. These instructions usually
reflect the directions of a majority of syndicate members as to their par-
ticipation in the agreement.
II. Syndicated Loan Agreements
Syndicated loan agreements are lengthy documents, with many provi-
sions governing the contractual relationships among the lenders, borrower
and agent bank. In a direct loan syndication, the provisions govern the
relationships between the borrower and the lenders, that amongst the
lenders themselves, and that between the lenders and the agent bank,
though occasionally this last relationship will be governed by a separate
agency agreement to which the borrower is not a party. In a participation
syndication, the documentation is simpler, with the loan agreement gov-
erning only the relationship between the borrower and lender; after the
execution of the loan agreement, the relationship of the participating banks
and the lead bank qua agent is determined. An overview of the types of
syndicated loans and of the more important provisions that govern the
relationships of lender, borrower, and agent in a direct loan syndication is
provided below.
A. SYNDICATED LOANS
International loan syndications have exhibited an increasing flexibility
with respect to pricing, funding, repayment, and length of the loan. The
most common type of syndicated loan is a term loan. A term loan may be
characterized as the lending of funds to a borrower for a specified period of
time after the execution of the loan agreement, with a commitment period of
three to five years comprising a medium-term loan. The borrower obtains
funds by drawing down the loan, with the entire amount usually drawn down
early in the life of the agreement. The repayment of the term loan is
pursuant to an amortization schedule. The schedule varies according to the
loan agreement, with some amortization commencing with the first draw
down of funds, to "bullet" loans, where there is no amortization over the
commitment period except at its expiration, at which time the principle is
entirely repaid.
A revolving credit loan provides the borrower with more flexibility than a
term loan with respect to draw down and repayment provisions. The bor-
rower can borrow, repay, and reborrow during the length of the loan up to a
specified ceiling. An 'evergreen' revolving loan facility involves an option to
negotiate early an extension of the commitment period, usually at the
election of the lender.
A stand-by loan enables a borrower obtain funds at any time during the
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commitment period for the entire amount of the credit. The stand-by loan
agreement is essentially a contingent contract under which the borrower has
the option to draw down funds to meet an adverse event or other financial
needs. It is to be distinguished from a term loan: the borrower's needs under
a term loan are imminent; under a stand-by, only contingent. Sovereign
borrowers may use a stand-by line of credit, for instance, to defend the
integrity of their currency in foreign exchange markets in the event of
balance of payment problems.
Loan agreements vary greatly with respect to setting the price at which the
borrower must pay for funds. Market pressures have created loan facilities
with interest rate options which differ according to maturity as well as the
market in which lenders will obtain funds. International syndicated loans
are predominantly funded using Eurocurrencies. In principle, there are as
many types of Eurocurrencies as nations whose currency is internationally
accepted as legal tender, though Eurodollars are the primary Eurocurrency.
Moreover, there are many Eurocurrency markets throughout the world,
with the largest centered in London.
The cost of a Eurocurrency financing to a borrower is the funding cost of
the Eurocurrency to the lender, plus a margin determined by negotiation.
The funding cost of Eurodollars in London, for instance, is the London
interbank offered rate (LIBOR).77 This is the rate at which banks in the
London market are prepared to lend to each other. Historically, LIBOR for
Eurodollars has been lower than the U.S. domestic prime rate for U.S.
dollars. There are several reasons for this advantage, principal of which is
that Eurodollars are not subject to national monetary control, and as a
result, are not subject to the costly prescribed requirement ratios on domes-
tic dollar deposits.
Recently, international syndicated loan agreements have provided bor-
rowers with the option to borrow a currency at the prime rate. For instance,
borrowers may elect to borrow U.S. dollars from domestic U.S. banks at
prime, rather than (Euro)dollars from London at LIBOR. The advantage of
this option is the result of the different funding practices in the two markets.
To provide Eurodollar loans, a bank must acquire a Eurodollar deposit,
which is made for a short term at a fixed rate. Since Eurodollar deposits are
short term and Eurodollar loans are usually long term, the bank must
acquire several sequential short-term Eurodollar deposits to fund a long-
term Eurodollar loan. The LIBOR of the loan would remain fixed for the
duration of the short-term deposit, but would change commensurate with
the cost of acquiring a new Eurodollar deposit, when the old one expired.
Due to the mismatching of maturities, the LIBOR would float over the
77. The interbank offered rate for lesser Eurocurrency markets is for instance, HIBOR for
Hong Kong, BIBOR for Bahrein, and so on.
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duration of the loan, but would remain fixed for a given length of time. The
U.S. prime rate applicable to the loan, on the other hand, floats daily under
the terms of the loan agreement. The borrower would elect to choose the
prime rate, if he expects it to fall and remain lower than the fixed LIBOR for
a specific interest period determination.
In some loan agreements, a borrower may have other interest rate
choices. For instance, he may be able to choose an interest rate based on
quotations for certificates of deposit (CDs) adjusted for reserve costs and
the cost of insuring CDs with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
This rate may be fixed or floating.78
B. PROVISIONS GOVERNING SYNDICATED LOAN AGREEMENTS
Provisions in international syndicated loan agreements, which are typi-
cally drafted by the legal counsel of the managing bank, can be roughly
classified as having either procedural or substantive importance in the loan
transaction. The procedural provisions cover the mechanics of the loan
transaction ranging from the initial disbursement of funds to the final
payment of principal and interest. These provisions govern primarily the
role of the agent bank in administering the loan. The substantive provisions,
on the other hand, determine the remedies the lending banks can effect,
were an event of default to occur in the course of the loan. These two general
types of provisions are outlined below, considering some of the legal prob-
lems lending and agent banks will encounter in a loan transaction. Both the
syndication of acceptance financing and the rescheduling of financial trans-
actions by commercial banks involve documentation similar to syndicated
loan agreements.
1. Procedural Provisions
International syndicated loan agreements have become standardized in
many respects, some of which are discussed in this section in order to
provide some idea of the manner in which these agreements are executed.
a. Advances
Upon the execution of the loan agreement, the lending banks severally
undertake to fund a proportionate amount of the active loan and each of the
draw downs specified in the agreement. The borrower notifies the agent
bank of the date and the aggregate amount of the draw down. The agent
bank, in turn, notifies the lending banks regarding the date, aggregate
amount, initial interest, and each bank's ratable portion of the borrowing.
78. Wall and Geary, Interest Rate Options, Funding Practices, and Yield Protections, INT'L
FIN. L. REV. 23, (Oct. 1982).
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The amount for which each bank is responsible is credited to the agent bank.
The amount is subsequently transferred by the agent to the borrower's
account.
The obligation of each lender to make an advance upon each borrowing is
not binding unless the agent bank receives the requisite documentation
satisfying the conditions precedent inherent to the loan agreement. The
conditions precedent are of two types, corresponding, respectively, to the
initial borrowing and all subsequent borrowings. With respect to the initial
borrowing, the agent bank must usually be furnished with: (1) applicable
guarantees or security, if any; (2) copies of all necessary corporate or
governmental organic documents, including board authorizations and gov-
ernmental authorizations and approvals, such as exchange controls consent;
(3) copies of the constitutional documents of the borrower; (4) legal opin-
ions on behalf of the borrower and lending banks; (5) certification of the
names and signatures of persons authorized to sign on behalf of the bor-
rower; and (6) promissory notes, depending on the jurisdiction evidencing
the loan agreement. With respect to furnishing notes, in the United States
and civil code countries, banking practice requires that loans be evidenced
by promissory notes; in the United Kingdom, notes have never been used,
with monies having been advanced by overdraft.79
Counsel on behalf of the borrower generally expresses an opinion that the
various obligations of the borrower under the loan document are valid,
binding and enforceable. In addition, the borrower's counsel will usually
express an opinion that: (1) the borrower, if a corporation, is duly orga-
nized under the laws of its jurisdiction; (2) the execution, delivery and
performance by the borrower of the credit agreement have been duly
authorized by all necessary corporate action, and do not contravene char-
ters, contracts or existing law applicable to the borrower; (3) all authoriza-
tions or approval from any governmental authority or regulatory body have
been duly obtained by the borrower and are in full force and effect; and
(4) the security instruments provided under the agreement, if any, have
been registered and perfected.
Special counsel on behalf of the lenders and the agent bank will seek to
provide an opinion regarding the law governing the credit documents. The
scope of the opinion rendered may vary, however. The opinion may be that
the loan documentation is a legal, valid and binding obligation of the
borrower, and enforceable against the borrower pursuant to its terms.
Another type of opinion is that the credit documentation is in substantially
acceptable legal form.80
79. Wood, supra note 2, at 244.
80. Ryan, supra note 27, at 44.
VOL. 18, NO. 4
INTERNATIONAL F'INANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 895
With respect to subsequent advances on each of the draw downs specified
in the loan agreement, including the first borrowing, the obligation of the
lending banks is subject to further conditions precedent. These include that
the representations and warranties made by the borrower are correct on and
as of the date of such borrowing as though made on that date; and that no
event which would comprise an event of default pursuant to the loan
agreement has occurred and is continuing. Failure by the borrower to satisfy
these conditions during any period of the loan agreement enables the
lending banks not only to suspend disbursement or draw down dates, but
also to seek remedies, a subject that is discussed in Part II. B. 2.a.ii, below.
b. Interest Rate Determination
The agent bank is responsible for determining the interest rate for each
draw down of new funds, and, of course, the rate at which old borrowings
are rolled over. Usually the agent will determine the interest rate of Euro-
dollars, for instance, on the basis of applicable quotations of LIBOR fur-
nished to and received by the agent from reference banks in London two
business days prior to a draw down of new funds, or the commencement of
an interest period, at which old funds are rolled over. The reference banks
are specified by the loan documentation and in the event one or more of the
reference banks are unable to provide a quotation, the interest rate typically
is to be based upon the quotation given by the remaining banks. Fur-
thermore, in the event U.S. dollars are not available in sufficient quantities
from London, or the agent receives word from a majority of lending banks
that the LIBOR will not reflect the cost of funding a borrowing, the agent is
to notify the borrower and lending banks. The agent at this juncture is to
enter into good faith negotiations with the borrower to determine an
alternative interest rate that reflects the costs of funding the borrowing to a
majority of banks. If no alternative rate is agreed upon, the agent is to notify
the borrower of the interest rate at which the majority banks will provide
funds. If the borrower finds the alternative rate objectionable, he may elect
to prepay the active loan; otherwise, the alternative rate will apply to the
new interest period. Of course, in the multi-interest rate option, the docu-
mentation will be difficult.
c. Repayment
The repayment of the loan is made according to an amortization schedule
agreed upon by the borrower and lending banks at the conclusion of negotia-
tions, and incorporated in the loan documentation. Payment is made when
the borrower deposits funds in the agent's account. The agent will distribute
these funds ratably to the lending banks. Since the agent bank may assume
that the borrower will be making payments on the due date unless it is
informed otherwise, the agent may in reliance upon such an assumption
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distribute its own funds on the due date to the lending banks. In the event
the borrower fails to make a full payment on the due date, the agent bank
may be indemnified by each lending bank an amount equal to the distributed
funds of the agent bank, with interest thereon.
2. Substantive Provisions: Lending Banks and Borrower
The substantive provisions in the loan agreement that are intended to
govern the various relationships among borrower, lending banks and agent
banks are varied. The protection lending banks seek against the prospect of
a borrower defaulting are found in the provisions regarding representations
and warranties, covenants, events of default and governing law. These
provisions will be discussed in this section. The substantive provisions
regulating the relationships of lending banks inter se will be discussed in the
following section.
a. Representations and Warranties
The borrower makes certain representations and warranties to the lend-
ing banks in the loan documentation. Both types of statements provide
information to the lending banks about the financial, commercial and con-
tractual condition of the borrower and the legal validity of the obligations it
will assume under the loan agreement. Representations and warranties
differ, however, in a technical sense. A warranty is a term inherent to the
loan agreement, whereas a representation is a statement of certain facts
made prior to or at the time of the execution of the loan agreement which
induces the lending banks to enter into the contract. 8' These technical
differences do not affect the express remedies afforded lending banks under
the loan agreement, though they may give rise to different remedies at
common law, a matter to be discussed shortly.
i. Types. Representations and warranties included in loan documenta-
tion vary principally according to the nature of the borrower. For instance, a
corporate borrower, whether foreign or domestically owned, or privately or
publicly owned, is required to provide several "legal" and "commercial"
representations and warranties according to current market practice. A list
of the legal representations and warranties applicable to a corporate bor-
rower would include statements that: (1) the borrower is duly incorporated,
validly existing, and in good standing under the laws of its jurisdiction;
(2) the borrower is acting within its corporate powers in the execution and
performance of the loan agreement, having been duly authorized by the
relevant corporate procedures; (3) the loan agreement is a legal, valid and
binding obligation of the borrower, enforceable pursuant to its terms; and
(4) the borrower has obtained all official consent regarding the making and
81. Wood, supra note 2, at 240.
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performance of the loan agreement. A similar list of commercial representa-
tions and warranties would include statements regarding (1) the borrower's
financial condition, including a recently audited financial statement provid-
ing full, true, and plain disclosure of its business operations, assets and
liabilities; (2) the borrower's involvement in material litigation, administra-
tive proceedings, and tax disputes; and (3) a representation that the bor-
rower is not in default under relevant ancillary agreements.
Those representations and warranties would differ significantly were the
borrower a sovereign state or a state-related institution. Perhaps most
important would be statements that the loan is required for the private and
commercial acts of the borrower rather than a public or governmental act
and that the borrower is subject to commercial law with respect to the
obligations it assumes under the loan agreement.82
ii. Remedies. The representations and warranties made by a borrower
must be true, at least with respect to the execution of a loan agreement and
the initial borrowing of funds and typically with respect to subsequent
borrowings. The veracity of these statements is a condition precedent to the
disbursement of funds, providing lending banks in the event of an untrue or
misleading statement with two express contractual remedies. First, the
lending banks may suspend all subsequent lending to the borrower until
such time as the representation is no longer incorrect or the condition
precedent has been waived by the lending banks.8 3 Second, the lending
banks may wish to cancel the undrawn portion of the loan,84 an irrevocable
decision that repudiates the contract, not allowing the borrower to cure the
defect in its statements. A third possible contractual remedy is that the
lending banks may wish to accelerate the outstanding loan, declaring the
drawn-down portion immediately due and repayable. The acceleration
remedy is triggered when the untrue or inaccurate representation or war-
ranty can be characterized as an express event of default, discussed in Part
II.B.2.c, below.
In the absence of express contractual remedies under the loan agreement,
the lending banks may resort to the common law remedies of rescission and
damages for breaches of representations and warranties. 85 Although there is
some confusion about the relationship between the remedies for breach of
representations and for breach of warranties, the claim of damages under
either head will not exceed the amount recoverable under the express
contractual remedy of acceleration. 8
6
82. Wood, supra note 2, at 243.
83. Clark and Taylor, Representations and Conditions Precedent in Eurocurrency Loan
Agreements, INT'L FIN. L. REV. 28 (July 1982).
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b. Covenants
Covenants provide another means by which lending banks can protect
themselves from the event of a borrower becoming unable to repay a loan.
Covenants are promises the borrower undertakes to fulfill during the life of
the loan, and as such become the parameters within which the borrower is
expected to operate, determining to a large extent what a borrower may or
may not do in a manner consistent with his ability to repay the loan. Lending
banks favor covenants because covenants provide banks with considerable
influence over the borrower's action; the borrower, on the other hand,
wishes to be free of these contractual constraints on its action. Negotiations
between the lead manager and borrower determine the extent to which the
lending banks under a loan agreement can control a borrower.
i. Types. The scope and purpose of covenants depend largely upon the
nature of the borrower and the circumstances underlying the loan negotia-
tion. Covenants restraining sovereign borrowers will be different from those
restraining corporate borrowers. Moreover, within each basic type of bor-
rower, differences will exist, depending on the creditworthiness of the
borrower (e.g., oil-rich sovereigns vs. financially troubled corporations), as
well as the type of activity for which the loan is provided (e.g., mergers vs.
project financings). Since most international lending is unsecured, two
covenants are invariably used to provide lenders with some protection
against other creditors, in the event the borrower becomes insolvent and is
subsequently liquidated: (1) the negative pledge; and (2) the pari passu
covenant.
The negative pledge covenant prohibits the borrower from granting secu-
rity interests in its assets or revenues in favor of other creditors. This
provision ensures that the lending banks will be treated equally with other
creditors who might otherwise, in the absence of the pledge, be granted a
mortgage, charge, pledge, loan, or other encumbrance on the borrower's
assets or revenues, thereby taking priority in a liquidation of the borrower
and leaving the lending banks a subordinate, unsecured interest, with rights
against the balance, if any. The negative pledge can achieve the same
purpose when applied against sovereign borrowers, though the context is
different with respect to the security interests prohibited. Negative pledges
will create equality between creditors, by preventing the pledging to a single
creditor of a sovereign's foreign currency reserves, or external assets in the
hands of foreign institutions.87
Negative pledge provisions may be relaxed somewhat to take into consid-
eration the realities of the borrower's commercial life. The most common
exceptions to negative pledges as an absolute covenant are: (1) prior and
87. Wood, supra note 2, at 146.
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existing security interests on assets; (2) subsequent security interests
assumed in the purchase of an asset, such as land subject to an existing
mortgage; (3) liens which arise by operation of law, such as repairers' liens
for the price of repair work; and (4) "equal and ratable security" clauses by
which the borrower is allowed to create security interests in favor of other
creditors so long as the lending banks are given the benefit of concurrent and
equal and ratable security in some other asset (notwithstanding the prob-
lems of comparable security interests in different assets). 88
The pari passu covenant usually accompanies the negative pledge. Its role
is to ensure that the rights of the lending banks will always rank at least pari
passu with the rights of the borrower's other unsecured creditors. As a
result, the pari passu provision prevents the subordination of the lending
banks to other unsecured creditors; the negative pledge covenant, the
subordination of lending banks to secured creditors.
The pari passu provision is relevant in the event an insolvent corporate
borrower is involuntarily liquidated. The lending banks will be entitled to
share pro rata in the distribution of assets. In the event that the corporate
laws governing the borrower will rank the unsecured claims, however, the
covenant will not prevent the lending banks from being discriminated
against.89 In the context of the sovereign borrower, the pari passu covenant
has a different effect. This provision will prevent sovereign borrowers from
discrimination against the lending banks in the payment of creditors out of
general revenues or foreign currency reserves.
In addition to negative pledge and pari passu covenants, the lending
banks may negotiate with corporate borrowers to include several others, the
most important of which are financial covenants. These covenants provide
the lending banks the opportunity of regulating the broad decisions under-
taken by the management of a corporation. So long as they are not too
restrictive, these covenants can provide the corporate borrower with
enough discretion to undertake corporate opportunities without compro-
mising the concern of the lending banks that the borrower may grow
excessively or undertake excessive liabilities. Financial covenants comprise
several financial tests, which the agent bank or the lending banks can
monitor, upon the receipt of the borrower's annual financial statements as a
condition of the loan documentation. Included in this set of financial tests
are measures to determine the debt-equity ratio, the net-worth minimum,
the ratio of current assets to liabilities, the net current assets, minimum
capital requirements, and so on. 90 The extent to which these tests protect the
creditors depends in large part on the interpretation of the annual reports,
88. Clark and Taylor, Conditions Precedent and Covenants in Eurocurrency Loan Agree-
ments, INT'L FIN. L REV. 18 (August 1982).
89. Wood, supra note 2, at 156.
90. Wood, supra note 2, at 160-61.
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the accounting principles underlying which are subject to wide variations
and rapid changes amongst countries. 91 Other covenants included in loan
documentation may restrict a corporate borrower from merging or from
using its funds in a manner other than the purpose for which they were given,
and, in the case of project financing, may compel the completion of the
project at a certain time.
ii. Remedies. In the event of a breach of covenant, the lending banks
may have recourse against the borrower under the express terms of the loan
agreement and at common law. Remedies under the loan agreement are
identical to those for breach of representations and warranties described in
Part II.B.2.a.ii, above: suspension and cancellation of scheduled borrow-
ings and acceleration of previous borrowings. At common law, the lending
banks may sue for damages for breach of covenant. This remedy will not
augment the remedies the banks have under the loan agreement since the
damages can only be an amount equal to the repayment of the loan under
the contractual acceleration remedy. Discretionary remedies, such as spe-
cific performance and injunctions, may apply only when other remedies
such as damages and rescission are unavailable.
c. Events of Default
Events of default are failures of the borrower to perform contractual
obligations undertaken in the loan agreement. These events of default may
be a breach of the loan agreement itself or an anticipatory breach whereby it
is presumed that the borrower will inevitably breach the loan agreement.
The characterization of a failure of the borrower to perform its obligations
under the loan agreement enables the lending banks to suspend, and subse-
quently cancel, any undrawn portion of the loan, and accelerate the remain-
ing balance of the loan.
i. Types. The events of default included in a loan agreement vary accord-
ing to the type of borrower. It is common for a corporate borrower to be
subject to several specific events of default clauses including (1) non-
payment, including failure to pay principal and interest due under the loan
agreement; (2) non-compliance in the performance of any of the covenants
under the loan agreement; and (3) inaccuracies in any representation or
warranty made or deemed made by the borrower. Though these provisions
may seem harsh, imposing unduly onerous terms on the borrower, several
mitigating techniques have been used in loan agreements. For instance, the
non-payment and non-compliance events are subject to grace periods,
within which a borrower may cure an inadvertent and trivial failure.
Moreover, materiality tests are frequently provided (e.g., "in any material
91. Logan, Term Loan Agreements, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW, LENDING, CAPITAL
TRANSFERS, AND INSTITUTIONS 15 (Robert Rendell ed. 1980).
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respect") so that trivial misrepresentation or breaches or warranty will not
be characterized as an event of default.
Clauses anticipating events of default under a loan agreement with a
corporate borrower are also varied. The most important is a cross-default
clause under which a default by the borrower under any indebtedness
permits the lending banks to accelerate the outstanding balance of the loan.
Of course, this clause may be less effective than intended because informa-
tion about an event of default under another loan agreement may be
disclosed neither by the other creditors nor by the borrower, a possibility
which would preclude the triggering of the cross-default clause. 92 Insolvency
is another anticipatory event of default. This event is subject to evidentiary
problems in proving insolvency. If objective tests are included in the loan
documentation, such as the inability to pay debts when they fall due, 93 they
must be drafted to take account of the bankruptcy and insolvency laws of the
borrower's jurisdiction, 94 lest failure to do so prevent the attachment of the
borrower's assets to a judgment claim. Moreover, these tests for insolvency
should consider liquidation and dissolution proceedings, subject to a grace
period in order to protect the borrower against actions served without due
cause.
95
A provision dealing with a change in ownership of the borrower is usually
included in loan documentation as an event of default. The lending banks
often make their credit decisions on the expectation that present ownership
and control will remain unchanged throughout the life of the loan agree-
ment. Nationalization or conversely, "privatization" or being taken-over by
another private group are events which make lending banks wish to review
their position as creditors, since any of these events may be regarded as
indicative of future default.
Finally, an omnibus event of default category called the material adverse
change provision is inserted in the loan documentation to apply to any
adverse events that are not expressly contemplated in the loan agreement
under other default categories. This provision applies to unexpected events,
the occurrence of which, in the opinion of the lending banks, impairs the
ability of the borrower to perform its obligations under the loan agreement.
Though a discretionary event of default, it is unlikely that a court would not
uphold the decision of creditors to accelerate the loan unless the decision
were unreasonable in light of the changed position of the borrower's cir-
cumstances.
There is always a question in the drafting of events-of-default clauses
92. Clark and Taylor, Events of Default in Eurocurrency Loan Agreements, INT'L FIN. L.
REV. 13 (Sept. 1982).
93. Wood, supra note 2, at 167.
94. Logan, supra note 91, at 19.
95. Wood, supra note 2, at 167.
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whether other parties related to the corporate borrower should be included.
It is usually the practice to include, for instance, the guarantor of the
borrower's loan. Otherwise, the lending banks may not have much recourse
to the guarantor in the event of the borrower defaulting, were the guarantor
itself in default. In additon, the subsidiaries of the borrower should be
monitored for default, since the liquidation or dissolution of the subsidiary
might affect the creditworthi ness of the entire group of companies. 96
With respect to sovereign borrowers, events of default provisions are
similar to those for corporate borrowers, but limited in number. For in-
stance, events of default are typically limited to non-payment, non-
compliance, inaccuracies in warranties and representation, cross-default,
and "material adverse change" clauses.
97
ii. Remedies. Events of default enable the lending banks to resort to the
contractual remedies inherent in the loan documentation. As mentioned
above, these remedies include the right to hold in abeyance, and subse-
quently suspend, undrawn portions of the loan, and to accelerate the out-
standing balance. Moreover, the lending banks may have recourse to de-
fault interest under the loan documentation. The rate of default interest
applies to any delayed payment of principal and interest, irrespective of
whether or not the loan had been accelerated. The rate of default interest is
usually a small premium of 1% or 2% higher than the rate specified for an
interest period under the loan documentation, an additional amount reflect-
ing the lending banks' extra costs involved in dealing with the defaulted
loan. An excessive premium that did not adequately reflect these costs may
be void if characterized as a penalty designed to terrorize the borrower into
performance. 98
Though events of default enable lending banks to accelerate the outstand-
ing balance under a loan agreement, lending banks may consider waiving
this remedy if the borrower in the absence of the loan acceleration is, or can
be expected to, become creditworthy. The reasons for waiving an event of
default are varied, principal of which is the self-interest of the lending banks.
The acceleration of the loan to a corporate borrower will probably cause its
insolvency, the consequence of which is that the lending banks may receive
less in the distribution of assets upon the involuntary distribution of the
borrower than upon the repayment of the loan, over a longer period of time.
This subject is discussed further in Part IV, below. Acceleration of the loan
as a contractual right, therefore, is exercised only as a last resort, usually
when, in the judgment of the lending banks, the borrower will eventually be
liquidated in the absence of the acceleration, a fact which compels the banks
to take action as soon as possible to protect their position.
96. Wood, supra note 2, at 169.
97. Wood, supra note 2, at 165.
98. Clark and Taylor, supra note 92, at 15.
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d. Governing Law
The selection of the law to govern the loan agreement between the
borrower and the lending banks is usually one of the most important
provisions in the loan documentation, though frequently the most terse. The
governing law determines the rights and obligations of the parties. To the
extent that the governing law may vary considerably, the parties wish to
select that law which affords the greatest protection in the event that rights
under the loan transaction must be enforced.
i. Express Choice of Law. The parties to a loan agreement usually have
complete autonomy when selecting the law to govern their obligations and
duties. Often the parties are at cross-purposes in the selection of a law, with
the actual choice depending on several factors, foremost of which are the
bargaining strength of the respective parties and the protection each party
seeks under the agreement. The lending banks prefer selecting either the
law of a major commercial country or state, often the one in which the loan is
funded such as England or New York, or the law of the country (or, in the
case of Canada and the United States, the province or state respectively) in
which they are located. The former basis for selecting a law reflects the
desire of the lending banks to have a well-developed, stable and predictable
body of commercial law governing complex international transactions so
that the parties may develop reasonable expectations about the operation of
the loan agreement. The latter basis provides the lending banks with a legal
system with which they are familiar, obviating the need to investigate the
legal risk entailed by the selection of a foreign law. Often these criteria
merge for many lending banks in a widely dispersed syndication of banks,
reflecting several nationalities including New York and London based
banks. The borrower, on the other hand, often prefers the jurisdiction in
which it is located, especially if it is a sovereign borrower. Apart from being
familiar with its own laws, the borrower may be the beneficiary of retro-
active legislation designed to protect its interests.
The wishes of the lending banks usually prevail, because in part they are
not compelled to lend funds if their position under a loan transaction is not
adequately protected. Otherwise, the lending banks, once having disbursed
the loan, and effectively meeting their only obligations under the loan
agreement, would be in a vulnerable position depending on a legal system
with which they are unfamiliar or in which they cannot repose much confi-
dence to protect their rights to the payment of principal and interests.
Although the borrower could go elsewhere in a competitive loan market,
other syndicates would probably be willing to compromise less on governing
law than on the spread charged on funding the loan: the former factor
protects the corpus of the loan, i.e., the expected repayment of principal and
interest; the latter protects only the expected profit. The instances in which
the foreign borrower will object to the lender's choice of governing law is
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limited usually to foreign governmental borrowers, which for policy reasons
or domestic legal constraints prefer their own domestic law to govern, or at
the very least, the absence of any choice of governing law.
9 9
The imposition of the lender's choice of governing law does not com-
pletely insulate the loan agreement from the law of the borrower's country.
Legal issues regarding the legal status of the borrower, the corporate power
of the borrower to enter into the loan agreement, the liability of its officers
for debts, and so on, are determined by the law of the foreign borrower.
l ° °
Moreover, in the event that the borrower's assets are not situated outside its
country, any enforcement action taken against these assets may find the
local court ignoring the foreign governing law to the extent it conflicts with
domestic laws pursuant to its own conflict-of-law rules. 10 1
The extent to which the lending banks cannot insulate completely their
choice of law from the law of the borrower should be the focus of concern of
the lending banks. An inquiry into the laws of the borrower's country is
warranted to determine the validity and effectiveness of the governing law.
Often, the prospect of undertaking proceedings subject to the law of the
borrower's country, i.e., enforcement against its assets located only in its
country, has given rise to two-tiered choice of law clauses: the agreement
shall be governed by the lender's choice of law, except in the event proceed-
ings are brought in the courts of the borrower's country, at which point the
laws of the borrower's country would apply.
ii. Absence of a Choice-of-Law Clause. Occasionally, parties to a loan
agreement will not make an express selection of governing law. Usually the
absence of a choice reflects a compromise in which the borrower, for a
number of reasons, especially if it is a sovereign borrower, will not submit to
the laws of a foreign jurisdiction, and the lenders will not submit to the
vagaries of the borrower's domestic law. Because the loan agreement can-
not sustain itself, some law must apply in the event the loan agreement must
be enforced.
The international rules for selecting a law to govern a loan agreement in
the absence of an express choice are unsettled, with several competing
theories having international currency. Usually courts first determine
whether there has been a tacit choice of law. The choice is strongly evi-
denced by the lenders' selection of their country's courts to have jurisdiction
in the case of a dispute, or in the event of a multinational representation of
lenders, the selection of the courts in the country of the agent. Unfortu-
nately, the tacit choice approach is somewhat suspect because it provides the
courts of the lender with a presumption that there must be a coincidence
99. Logan, supra note 91, at 17.
100. Wood, supra note 2, at 6.
101. Id.
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between forum and governing law, even though the absence of governing
law, especially the lenders', strongly suggests the product of compromise in
which neither the borrower's nor the lenders' law could be chosen.
Beyond tacit choice lie several theories upon which a court may base its
determination of the governing law. One is the "center of gravity theory,"
otherwise known as the "most significant relationship" test, which provides
a presumption that the system of law with which the loan agreement is most
closely connected should apply. 102 The plans of contract negotiation and
execution, the place of currency or of the loan funding, for example, are nexi
which may, given the weighing calculus of a court, determine the governing
law. Predictability is not the consequence of this test, however, if the loan
transaction is connected to too many factors.
Another approach often taken is the application of rigid presumptions,
usually looking to the law of place of contracting or performace.10 3 The
former is suspect, though, because the execution of a contract may not bear
any relationship to the contract. The latter test is more appropriate, usually
favoring the laws of the country in which the agent bank is located, because
the agent bank receives the borrower's payment of principal and interest.
Finally, flexible methods may be used to determine the governing law,
including providing the most just result given the particular circumstances,
applying the law of the state having the most urgent policy interest in having
its law applied (the "governmental interest analysis approach,") and omni-
bus theories incorporating various provisions of the conflicts restatement to
achieve greater predictability in conflict resolution.
10 4
In order to develop reasonable expectations about the performance of the
borrower's obligations under a loan agreement, the lending banks can
minimize the lack of predictability that runs with the absence of an express
choice of law. The unsettled international rules regarding choice of law
suggest that the lending banks compel the borrower to submit to the jurisdic-
tion of the courts in the country with the desired law, or at the very least,
arrange the loan in such a way that most of its aspects are connected to the
country whose law they desire to be applied, i.e., the negotiation, execution
and performance of the loan should occur in the desired country.
e. Jurisdiction
i. General Considerations. The parties to a loan agreement may also
expressly select a court to have jurisdiction over a loan agreement in the
event a dispute over its terms arises. Although the selection of a forum may
be of value to a borrower (e.g., litigation costs may differ significantly or the
102. Wood, supra note 2, at 12.
103. Wood, supra note 2, at 17.
104. Wood, supra note 2, at 15-16.
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borrower may be the party bringing the action because the agent bank, for
some reason may not advance funds on a draw down), the lending banks
often have the most to gain, since any dispute that must be adjudicated by
the courts will likely involve an execution judgment against the assets of the
borrower. Instead of relying upon the domestic, and perhaps hostile, courts
of the borrower's country to render judgment, the lending bank in selecting
an external forum will confer on courts the jurisdiction they may not
otherwise have to adjudicate a claim against the borrower. The choice of
external forum preserves the valuable option of proceeding against the
borrower's external assets, in the events that the borrower's courts do not
attach judgment against its domestic assets and foreign courts are unwilling
to enforce a domestic-court judgment.
The legal considerations underlying the choice of an external forum are
often concurrent with those underlying the choice of a governing law. An
external forum complements an external governing law because without the
former, the lending banks will have to rely upon the borrower's court to
apply an external governing law which may be subject to the primacy of
domestic laws in the event of conflicts of laws over the attachment or
execution of assets. Moreover, the choice of an external forum should
coincide with the choice of a governing law, in order to achieve greater
predictability, and obviate the procedural inconvenience for a court to apply
the law of another country to a loan agreement. Finally, the choice of
external forum should depend on a court that is experienced in commercial
litigation and impartial to international disputes. 105
ii. Scope of Jurisdiction. The express submission of a borrower to an
external forum is generally all that is required to confer jurisdiction on that
court. In the absence of this express submission, the court may have to resort
to "long-arm" statutes to exercise personal jurisdiction over the borrower,
the application of which usually depends on some form of contract between
the forum and the borrower. In any event, the extent to which courts can
exercise their powers, whether conferred by contract or statute, depends on
several factors, the relevance of which vary, depending on the nationality of
the court. Although a summary of these factors is beyond the scope of this
article, a few factors will be mentioned. For instance, in the event of the
express submission of the borrower, a court may not exercise its jurisdiction
unless a borrower, given the condition of a loan agreement, has expressly
appointed an agent situated in the jurisdiction of the forum on whom
process may be served. 10 6
Some courts will require as a necessary but not sufficient condition in the
105. Wood, supra note 2, at 59.
106. Gruson, Legal Aspects of International Lending, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS, at 27-19. (I. Walter ed. 1982).
VOL. 18, NO. 4
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 907
exercise of their jurisdiction that at least one of the litigants to be a citizen of
the forum's state, a condition which provides subject matter jurisdiction
which cannot be conferred by the parties themselves. Once subject matter
jurisdiction is present, a court may consider: (1) the defendant's connection
with the forum; (2) the connection of the transaction to the forum; and
(3) the location of assets in the territory over which the forum has
jurisdiction. 107
A court which has jurisdiction over a dispute arising from the loan
agreement may in its own discretion choose not to exercise its powers. A
court, for instance, may refuse jurisdiction upon the basis of forum non
conveniens. This doctrine enables a court to refuse jurisdiction if it considers
itself to be a seriously inconvenient forum of adjudicating a dispute, and a
more appropriate forum is available. The practical significance of this doc-
trine, however, is limited if the parties have sufficient resources to litigate in
any court in the world. 108
iii. Exclusive Jurisdiction. An exclusive choice of forum serves two func-
tions. The first is that it is a submission to the jurisdiction of a particular
court by both parties to a loan agreement. Second, and the obverse of the
first function, is that the potential jurisdiction of all other courts have been
ousted. The second function is important to a borrower in that it prevents
the lending banks from looking at several fora, seeking the most advan-
tageous jurisdiction.
iv. Sovereign Immunity. Sovereign immunity poses special problems
with respect to exercising jurisdiction and enforcing judgments. Unless a
sovereign borrower has contractually waived its immunity, or falls under
one of the statutory exceptions provided for by a relevent "state immunity"
act, the court can neither enforce judgment nor exercise its jurisdiction. The
topic of state immunity is briefly considered in the following section.
f. Sovereign Immunity
Today, sovereign states and state entities undertake the lion's share of the
borrowing in the syndicated credit market. Without special attention being
paid to the drafting of loan documentation, the lending banks may not have
any legal recourse against a sovereign borrower in the event of a dispute, as
the latter could claim sovereign immunity, a time-honored doctrine that
immunized sovereign borrowers from court action. The doctrine has been in
retreat recently. Case law and the subsequent codification of its principles in
the state immunity legislation of the United Kingdom, the United States,
and Canada, for example, have restricted the doctrine.
Lenders have two lines of legal defense in dealing with sovereign immu-
107. Wood, supra note 2, at 61-66.
108. Wood, supra note 2, at 68.
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nity. The first is that the lenders induce the sovereign borrower to waive
explicitly immunity from suit, immunity from attachment of assets in aid of
execution, and immunity from execution upon judgment. 10 9 This approach
is not always available, however, due to the inequality in bargaining posi-
tions between sovereign and the syndicate of lending banks. The second line
is that the lenders rely upon sovereign immunity legislation, structuring the
loan transaction in such a way so that it falls within the exceptions provided
to immunity by the relevant legislation. To appreciate this second line of
defense against sovereign immunity, a cursory survey of the statutes of the
United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada follows.
i. United Kingdom State Immunity Act 1978. The United Kindgom
passed the State Immunity Act in 1978, "0 enabling the country to become a
party to the European Convention on State Immunit,. One of the principal
thrusts of the legislation was to preserve recent case law which permitted suit
and enforcement if and when the sovereign entered into a transaction that
was commercial (jure gestionis), and not governmental (jure imperii) in
nature.' 1 Another thrust of the legislation was to circumvent earlier case
law which held that, unless a sovereign had submitted to the jurisdiction of
English courts, no action could be brought; and even in the event of
submission, a judgment might be permitted, though an execution could only
occur with the sovereign making a separate waiver of immunity in regard to
execution. 112 A contractual waiver of immunity from execution in loan
agreements was later held to be without legal effect.
113
As a result, the Act states that sovereigns are immune from suit unless
the transaction is caught by one of the exceptions, which include:
(1) submission (section 2) to English jurisdiction as an express acceptance
of English governing law and waiver of immunity are not sufficient in
themselves; and (2) commercial transactions (section 3) which by definition
include "any loan or other transaction for the provision of finance and any
guarantee or indemnity in respect of any such transaction or of any other
financial obligation." Moreover, the Act states that sovereigns are immune
from execution without the consent of the state except against property used
for commercial purposes. The Act does not prevent set-off, however, be-
cause the funds can be appropriated by the lending banks without judicial
intervention.
The Act does not distinguish between the state on the one hand, and state
entities and separate state bodies on the other hand, in the scope of immu-
nity accorded. For instance, state entities such as central banks, nationalized
109. Gruson, supra note 106, at 27-15.
110. State Immunity Act, 1978 (U.K.) c.33.
111. Trendtax Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria (1977), 1 All. E.R. 881.
112. Duff Development Co. Ltd. v. Government of Kalantan (1924), A.C. 797.
113. Kahan v. Pakistan Federation (1951), 2 K.B. 1003.
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industry and so on are subject to suit if the loan transaction is not in the
exercise of sovereign authority; and in the event that it is, the state entify still
has no immunity if caught by one of the exceptions. The Act does not apply
retroactively.
ii. United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976. The United
States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) 114 was designed to
codify the distinction the Department of State made in the Tate Letter of
1952 between the commercial and governmental nature of a transaction. It
was recognized that only the latter type of transaction was subject to the
defense of immunity. The Act also sought to eliminate the administrative
influence the State Department exercised on behalf of a foreign state on
domestic courts deliberating about the nature of a transaction. It was felt
that this lack of intervention would create more predictability and unifor-
mity in the courts' decisions.
11 5
The approach of the FSIA is similar to the U.K. Act in that it granted
extensive sovereign immunity subject to several exceptions. A foreign state,
including, corporate instrumentalities in which the state owns a majority of
shares or interest, is immune from U.S. jurisdiction unless, inter alia:
(1) there has been an express or implied waiver of immunity; (2) the
transaction is commerical in nature and was carried on in the United States;
or (3) the transaction was performed within, or having direct effect within,
the United States in relation to a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere.1 6 The property in the U.S. of a foreign state, whether or not it is
commercially used, is not immune from exception upon a judgment, and
attachment in aid of execution, if the foreign state expressly or implicitly
waives its immunity. Moreover, in the absence of a waiver, commercially
used property that is or was used for the commercial activity upon which suit
is predicated is not immune."
7
In the absence of an express or implied waiver, the lending banks would
not have much legal recourse to the assets of the sovereign borrower under
the FSIA. Commercially used property caught by one of the exceptions is
not likely to be involved in many financial transactions, and the right of
set-off falls outside the Act. Moreover, the property of the central bank or a
foreign state is immune from any attachment and execution in the United
States, as well as the U.K., because both countries wish to encourage the
holding of reserves in their respective money markets.11 8 The only relevant
114. U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441,
and 1602 et. seq.
115. Wall, Waiver of Sovereign Immunity Under United States Law, INT'L. FIN. L. REV. 28
(November 1982).
116. Supra note 114, Section 1605.
117. Supra note 114, Sections 1608 and 1609.
118. Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance, vol. 2, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS &
LAW SERIES, at 4-32, 34 (1983).
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assistance the FSIA would make available in the absence of a waiver is in the
event that a claim is based upon a commercial activity carried on by an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state in the United States or upon an
act performed within, or having direct effect within, the United States in
relation to its activities elsewhere. In this instance, the property of the
agency or instrumentality would attach in aid of execution or from execution
upon judgment, irrespective of whether or not the property was commer-
cially used, and used in the activity upon which suit is brought. For instance,
a borrowing of funds from U.S. commercial banks in the United States by
the agency or instrumentality could be characterized as such a commercial
activity that would de-immunize its property held in the United States, if
any, from execution upon judgment." 19
iii. Canada State Immunity Act 1982. Canada passed its own State Im-
munity Act in 1982. 120 It follows the U.K. and U.S. acts in validating the
extensive immunity of sovereigns subject to several exceptions, including:
(1) express submission to Canadian jurisdiction before or after suit is
brought; 12 (2) express or implicit waiver of immunity from attachment
execution, arrest, detention, seizure, or forfeiture; 22 and (3) engaging in
commercial activity whereby any particular transaction or course of conduct
is of a commercial character. Unfortunately, the Act does not define com-
mercial act as, in part, "any loan or other transaction for the provision of
finance and any guarantee or indemnity," as the U.K. Act does. Instead, the
Canadian Act leaves the meaning subject to judicial interpretation, creating
uncertainty as to whether, for instance, a sovereign stand-by line of credit to
defend a domestic currency against depreciation would be construed as a
commercial act.
g. Other Provisions
Eurocurrency syndicated loan agreements have standardized provisions
designed to protect the yield that lenders earn on the loan throughout its
operation. The yield is the fixed spread representing the difference between
the LIBOR cost of the Eurocurrency funding to the lender and the rate of
the loan paid by the borrower. The borrower is to indemnify the lenders in
the event that there are increased costs of funding due to a change in law,
reserve requirements, and other monetary requirements. Moreover, pay-
ments by the borrower must be made free of withholding and all other
foreign taxes. 1
23
119. Gruson, supra note 106, at 27-14.
120. State Immunity Act, S.C. 80-81-82, c.95.
121. Sec. 4(2)(a).
122. Sec. 11(1)(a).
123. Gruson, supra note 106, at 27-11.
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3. Substantive Provisions: Lending Banks Inter Se
a. Amendments and Waivers: Unanimity and
Majority Rule
A direct loan syndication involves many lenders with divergent interests
based on several factors, including their position in managing and arranging
the syndicate, their closeness to the borrower, and the importance of their
loan commitment to the syndicated credit as well as to their own portfolio of
assets. In the event decisions must be made about managing those aspects of
the loan not delegated to the agent bank, some express provisions are
required to reconcile the divergent interests of the lending banks, lest an
impasse develop.
The practice of international loan syndications has given rise to two
different approaches to this problem, depending largely on the type of banks
involved in the syndication. In the case of a very heterogeneous syndication,
with many banks possessing diverse asset bases not necessarily correlated
with their commitment to the loan syndication, decisionmaking tends to be
two-tiered: (1) unanimity is required to ratify changes made in the principal
amount of the loan commitment of each lender, the interest payable on the
principal amount and the amortization dates and amounts of repayment;1"4
and (2) a majority, often a simple one, of lending banks is required to make
any amendment to or waive any provision of the loan agreement not subject
to unanimity, with the majority determined by the value of the commit-
ments of the lending banks rather that the number of lenders.
The division between these two provinces of decision-making will vary
depending on the dynamics of the formation of the syndication. Typically
more changes are subject to lender unanimity than are listed above. The
compromise struck between unanimity and majority rule reflects the con-
cern smaller banks may have in protecting their involvement in the syndica-
tion, especially in the event of either rescheduling or increasing a loan to a
borrower whose creditworthiness has become suspect. Unanimity allays the
fear of the smaller bank that its interest will be sacrificed to the common
interests of the borrower and major lenders arising out of interests extrinsic
to, and concurrent with, the loan transaction. On the other hand, the large
lending banks are protected from the action of the smaller banks through the
majority rule. Majority rule applies to decisions regarding the waiving of
events of default, which would include at least default events such as
non-payment, non-compliance with covenants and inaccuracies in repre-
sentations and warranties. As a result, dissenting banks could neither
accelerate the loan in order to collect its portion of the loan commitment,
124. Stansbury, Legal Aspects of Syndicated Eurolending, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
HANDBOOK, at 1-3.520 (A. George and I. Giddy ed.) (1983).
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nor default on its obligations to provide further monies on subsequent
draw-down periods without contractual sanctions being applied.
The two-tiered decisionmaking procedure effects will lead to tensions
between the syndicate lending banks in the event of rescheduling the loan,
as is discussed in Part IV, below.
In the event that the lending banks are fairly homogeneous, and few in
number, a unanimity approach, or at least one not requiring a majority, may
be adopted by the lending banks. The reasons for this approach are two-
fold: (1) the sophistication of the lending banks and the relative nondiver-
gence of their interests makes it unnecessary to have a majority rule to
circumvent a bank dissenting to a step which is in the interests of the lending
banks as a whole; and (2) the commitment of each bank is too large to be
subject to the majority decision of the other banks.125
b. Sharing of Payments
Lending banks in a syndicate usually subscribe to egalitarian principles to
regulate the receipt of payments which arise from either the normal opera-
tion of the loan or the collections occasioned by an event of default: no one
bank is entitled to receive payments in excess of its pro rata commitment of
funds to the syndicate, and in priority to the other banks. Sharing of
payments clauses are easily applicable during the normal operation of the
loan. The borrower remits payments of principal and interest to the agent
bank, which in turn distributes the receipts commensurate with the lending
commitment of each bank. These sharing clauses preclude the borrower
from giving preferential treatment to any one lender. In the event a particu-
lar lending bank is singled out to receive funds prior to the other syndicate
banks, it typically is under a contractual duty to return the entire amount
with interest to the agent bank for a subsequent redistribution to the
remaining lending banks. In the absence of a sharing clause, it is thought
that the lending bank subject to preferential treatment is under a duty to
hold the monies on constructive trust for subsequent redistribution by the
agent bank. 12
6
The operation of sharing clauses during a default is more problematical,
however. Prior to joining a syndicate, a lending bank may often hold a
deposit from the borrower which it expects to set off against its unpaid share
of the syndicated loan in the event of default. Moreover, it may hold a
security of the borrower from previus loan commitments, the proceeds from
the disposition of which would be applied towards its unpaid share. The
prospect of sharing the funds arising from these sources may discourage
banks from joining a syndicate, or if they are major banks, may preclude the
125. Wood, supra note 2, at 271.
126. Wood, supra note 2, at 272.
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incorporation of such sharing clauses in the loan documentation. One
solution that has been adopted is for the lending bank, which receives
payment from either set-off or the disposition of a security in excess of the
amount to which it is entitled on a pro rata basis, to purchase from the other
lending banks participations in their advances to the borrower in such
amounts that the excess payment received by the lending bank is shared
ratably with the other banks. Another solution is that a lending bank which
has advanced funds to a borrower through a syndicate by sharing provisions
and otherwise without sharing obligations may allocate funds from the
exercise of set-off first to its loans in which there are no sharing obligations
with the balance, if any, applied to the loans governed by these sharing
provisions. 127
III. Syndicated Acceptance Financing
Syndicated bankers' acceptances comprise a relatively new method by
which banks provide credit to a customer without necessarily advancing
their own funds, and at a cost lower than that of borrowing. It is used
specifically to finance transactions, such as short-term trade, which qualify
under statute and administrative discretion over favorable regulatory treat-
ment designed to reduce the credit costs of this facility. The syndication of
acceptance financing, moreover, is not unlike the syndication of term-loan
agreements-Eurocurrency or otherwise-as banks form syndicates before
and after the acceptance financing agreement is executed, and either to
comply with domestic lending ceiling requirements or to transfer the risk
inherent in this type of credit to others. In addition, the loan documentation
underlying acceptance financing is similar to that underlying term-loan
agreements, with, at the very least, provisions regarding representations,
warranties, covenants, and events of default. Some of the issues encoun-
tered in the syndication of acceptance financing are discussed below.
A. TYPES OF BANKERS' ACCEPTANCES
Acceptance financing is used throughout much of the world as a vehicle by
which a bank can advance credit to a bank customer without necessarily
using its own funds. In New York, the instrument evidencing this arrange-
ment is called a banker's acceptance (BA); in London, a sterling accept-
ance. The instrument itself is a time draft (or, in another parlance, a term bill
of exchange) drawn by the customer (drawer) on a bank (drawee) and
accepted by the drawee bank (acceptor). Acceptance by the (drawee/accep-
tor) bank commonly consists of the word "accepted" with the date of
127. Stansbury, supra note 124.
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maturity stamped across the draft, though other words such as "certified" or
"good," accompanied by a signature, are also adequate. 128
The act of acceptance is legally significant. It transmogrifies the draft
drawn on the bank by a customer into a signed promise that the bank will
honor the draft upon its maturity. As a consequence, the accepting bank is
primarily liable to the holder of the BA to pay the value thereof at its
maturity. The borrower, on the other hand, unless he writes "without
recourse" on the instrument, is liable to a subsequent holder of the BA in
the event the accepting bank should dishonor the instrument at its
maturity. 129 Since the act of acceptance entails a degree of risk the bank
must bear, the drawer will pay the bank an acceptance fee in consideration
for its accepting the draft.
The drawer of the accepted draft can sell the BA to either the accepting
bank or to the market for a discount, which represents the value of money
today for an amount paid at a later date. In each case, the drawer can be put
into funds immediately after the time draft is accepted. The accepting bank
need not buy the BA, but if it does, it will advance funds to the drawer. The
normal practice in New York is for the acceptance to be sold to the accepting
bank; in England, the acceptance may be sold by the accepting bank in the
market at the request and for the account of the drawer. 130 In the event the
accepting bank does not act as agent for the drawer, the bank may either
hold the instrument to maturity, or discount it in (resell it to) the market. In
the former case, the bank ultimately advances its own funds to its customer;
in the latter case it does not.
The market for BAs in the United States is an over-the-counter market
comprised of about 16 non-bank dealer firms, most of which are in New
York, whose clients range from foreign central banks and governments to
domestic and foreign private investors, all of whom wish to hold this rel-
atively risk-free instrument to maturity. 131 In London, the sterling accep-
tances are sold to Discount Houses, and other types of investors such as
corporate treasurers and commercial banks which have a need for various
types of short-term instruments, including Treasury Bills and acceptances.
The Discount Houses may in turn sell acceptances to the Bank of England,
whereas in the United States they may be bought by the Federal Reserve
through normal market operations. 132 Eventually the BA will mature. The
accepting bank at maturity will pay the value specified on the BA, thereby
128. Ryan, What a Lawyer Should Know About Bankers' Acceptances, THE PRACICAL
LAWYER, Vol. 27, Mar. 1981, at 52.
129. Id. at 52.
130. Peet and Robertson, How to Arrange Syndicated U.S. Eligible Bankers' Acceptance
Financings, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 1982 at 17.
131. Ryan, supra note 128, at 53.
132. Peet, supra note 130, at 17.
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discharging not only its own primary obligation, but also the secondary
obligation of the drawer to the holder of the BA.
Underlying the creation of a BA is an executed acceptance credit agree-
ment between the accepting bank and its customer, the drawer of the BA.
This separate contract is necessary because it obligates the drawer, in
consideration for the one or more drafts drawn on and accepted by the bank,
to pay the amount of each draft to the accepting bank before or on the date
of maturity. As a result, the accepting bank will be concurrently reimbursed
by the drawer the very amount it pays to the holder of the BA at its maturity.
A banker's acceptance may be categorized as either eligible or ineligible
pursuant to statute or administrative discretion. An eligible BA is entitled to
certain regulatory advantages to which an ineligible one is not. These
regulatory advantages ultimately mean that the cost of eligible acceptance
financing will be less than that of normal bank borrowing. In the United
States, these regulatory advantages include: (1) the proceeds received by
the accepting bank from its sale of an eligible BA are not subject to reserve
requirements, a monetary regulation which imposes higher costs of provid-
ing credit; (2) the primary liability of an accepting bank on the BA is not
subject to the aggregate indebtedness limit imposed by statute, 133 though it
is subject to a separate ceiling on eligible BA's, 134 and (3) the liability of the
drawer under the acceptance credit agreement is not subject to the bank's
lending limits to a drawer 135 (unless the bank has not sold the BA to the
market) though there is a separate ceiling on BA's for each customer. 136
These exemptions are available to national U.S. banks; the treatment
accorded state chartered banks, non-member U.S. banks, and U.S.
branches and agencies of foreign banks is different, and is not treated here.
In the United Kingdom, only the exemption from reserve requirements
applies. There are no statutory ceilings on BA creation as the Bank of
England exercises informal control over the volume of each bank's accep-
tances.
The eligibility of a BA depends on the nature of the transaction that gives
rise to the drawer's need for acceptance financing. In the United States, the
requirements for the eligibility of a BA created by a member bank of the
Federal Reserve System were stated in broad statutory terms in the Federal
Reserve Act of 1912.137 Since then, the administrative practice of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has resulted in numerous
published rulings, the result of which has made the ascertaining of eligibility
a technical exercise. To be eligible, the BA must generally finance transac-
133. 12 U.S.C. § 82.
134. 12 U.S.C. § 372.
135. 12 U.S.C. § 84.
136. 12 U.S.C. § 372.
137. 12 U.S.C. § 372.
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tions that involve: (1) the importation or exportation of goods, not neces-
sarily involving parties situated in the United States; (2) the shipment of
goods within the United States; or (3) the storage of goods. The BA must be
drawn for a short term not to exceed 180 days.138 The denominating of a BA
in foreign currency, in itself, does not bar eligibility. 139 In the United
Kingdom, eligibility is determined by the Bank of England, which publishes
and distributes guidelines. At one time, the administrative practice of the
Bank permitted the use of BAs for a wide variety of purposes extending
beyond trade and trade-related transactions. The basis for eligibility has
narrowed considerably to financing which is short-term, self-liquidating,
and related to trade. Bills of exchange drawn for working capital purposes,
for instance, as well as bills the terms of which exceed 180 days, are no longer
eligible.
Since the administrative practice of the Bank of England and the Federal
Reserve System are extremely complex, and constantly evolving, any dis-
cussion of eligibility beyond the general positions outlined above is beyond
the scope of this article.
B. SYNDICATION
The syndication of a BA stems from the general reasons which underlie
the syndication of any financial transaction. For instance, a bank does not
wish to absorb the entire risk associated with being the sole primary obligor/
payee in the event the drawer under the acceptance credit agreement
defaults. Moreover, a bank may often be incapable of financing large
acceptances, or find it commercially imprudent to do so for fear of "crowd-
ing-out" or depreciating the value of its own commercial paper as a source of
funds. Finally, in some jurisdictions, like the United States, a bank may be
legally constrained from creating acceptances in excess of some ceiling for
individual customers or for all customers.
1. Syndication Methods
Acceptance syndication techniques are not unlike those involved in syndi-
cating term-loan agreements. The direct acceptance syndication involves a
multilateral acceptance credit agreement, in which all the banks agree to
accept and discount drafts drawn by the drawer. The obligations of the
banks are several and not joint, as each bank assumes a primary obligation
for only the draft drawn on and accepted by it.
A participation acceptance syndicate involves several banks, but accep-
138. 12 U.S.C. § 372. For an excellent discussion of eligibility of acceptance, see supra note
130, at 18-20.
139. Peet, supra note 130, at 17.
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tances would be created by only one bank, the lead bank. In this case, the
lead bank would execute the acceptance credit agreement with the customer
and assume a primary obligation for the drafts drawn on andaccepted by it.
The remaining banks would enter the syndicate after the creation of accep-
tances by the lead bank under a participation contract or some other
agreement that obligates each bank in the syndicate to pay its pro rata share
of the acceptor bank's liability in the event the drawer defaults. 140
The first two techniques may be easily combined in an acceptance facility
in which several acceptances are created on a drawdown, with some banks
subsequently deciding to participate out to other banks an interest in the
payment to which it is entitled under the acceptance credit agreement in
consideration for money and an obligation from each participant to share in
the acceptor bank's liability in the event of default.' 41
2. Mechanics of Direct Acceptance Syndicates
Under a multilateral acceptance credit agreement, the syndicate banks
agree to accept and discount drafts drawn by the drawer upon a notice to an
agent bank. In order to receive funds quickly, the drawer supplies each
bank, or the agent, depending on the acceptance facility and syndicate
agreement, with signed and endorsed drafts incomplete as to date, amount
and maturity. The banks or the agent have the drawer's power of attorney to
complete drafts; in a very streamlined acceptance facility, the agent will
have the bank's power of attorney to accept the drafts presented pursuant to
the terms of the facility. Once the drafts are accepted and discounted in (sold
to) the market, the agent makes the proceeds available to the drawer.' 42
Upon maturity, a bank is responsible for each acceptance it created and
receives payments from the agent (who has received payments from the
drawer) pursuant to the terms of the acceptance facility.
3. Documentation under Direct Acceptance Syndicates
The documentation under an acceptance credit agreement is similar to
that in a syndicated loan agreement, discussed above in Part II.B. Provisions
cover the mechanics such as determining the rate of discount and the
acceptance commission and specifying the drawdown and repayment proce-
dures. Other provisions protect the credit position of the banks, such as
representations and warranties, covenants, events of default, governing
law, forum, and waivers of sovereign immunity, if necessary.
140. Ryan, supra note 128, at 65.
141. There is some debate in the United States about whether or not an acceptor bank may
subtract the portions of the B.A. it participates out to other banks from its aggregate creation of
acceptances so as not to exceed the acceptance ceiling to an individual drawer or in aggregate.
This debate is expressed well by Ryan, supra note 128, at 65-66.
142. Peet, supra note 130, at 20.
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IV. Rescheduling
A. INTRODUCTION
Borrowers, whether they be corporate or sovereign, often find themselves
in trouble under existing syndicated credit arrangements with commercial
banks. An event of default is either imminent, or has occurred when the
borrower is unable to meet its liabilities as they become due. Commercial
banks can choose between two courses of action upon this type of declared
or imminent default. They may either enforce collection of the borrower's
assets by whatever means possible or (2) reschedule and refinance the
obligations of the borrower. Improbable as it seems, it is unlikely that the
first course will be selected. The reasons are varied.
Apart from secured transactions, which are not commonplace in the
realm of international finance except for ship and project finance, 143 syndi-
cates of commercial banks may exercise the right of set-off against whatever
deposits are currently in a member's possession, as well as bring suit and
enforce judgment, by either attachment or execution. The deposits subject
to set-off are almost always insufficient, frequently having been depleted in
large part to prevent a default. Moreover, the deposits of a bank engaged in
other syndicated credits have to be shared amongst all the banks in all the
syndicates.
Attachment and execution against the borrower's assets are also not
without problems, as is discussed in Part II.B.2.f., above. For example, in
the case of the foreign borrower, the attachment or execution of assets may
cause voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy. A piecemeal seizure of assets by
one syndicate of creditors may cause other creditors, syndicated or other-
wise, to rush into enforcement proceedings under their cross-default
clauses. Bankruptcy liquidation will lead to a freezing of claims and perhaps
a pari passu distribution of the proceeds realized from the liquidation to the
assets, except in those jurisdictions where preferential treatment is accorded
domestic creditors over foreign creditors. In all likelihood, the distribution
of assets will yield much less than the collective claims of the creditors.
The sovereign borrower is treated differently under enforcement pro-
ceedings because state insolvency is not governed by the same rules as
corporate bankruptcy. A court can neither seize nor sell a sovereign's
territory in satisfaction of a debt. Other domestic assets can be protected by
retroactive legislation, with perhaps declaration of a moratorium on foreign
debt. External assets, moreover, may not be entirely subject to enforcement
proceedings. Issues of sovereign immunity impose obstacles leaving little to
provide satisfaction for the enforcement of a judgment. Even the reserves of
the central bank of the sovereign debtor may be immune from suit and
judgment.
143. Supra note 2, at 326.
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Enforcement proceedings and bankruptcy are measures of the last resort.
It is much better to renegotiate the credit agreement with the debtor, either
rescheduling the amortization schedule of principal and interest, or provid-
ing refinancing-"new money"-so that a default can be avoided. The hope
of the syndicate with the second course is that the debtor will have the
opportunity to reorganize its finances and, in turn, restore its capacity to
meet its obligations. Even in those cases where it is all but impossible for a
debtor to meet all its obligations, a syndicate hopes that the part perform-
ance of the borrower's obligations will provide a greater amount than that
realized under enforcement proceedings and set-off; it is never the province
of commercial banks to provide aid to a chronic debtor.
The following discussion surveys many of the legal issues that underlie the
rescheduling and refinancing of syndicated credits and, for that matter, all
commercial bank credit. In that discussion, "rescheduling" means loosely
the deferral of debt obligations in arrears and in imminent default and
"refinancing" means the providing of "new money" to help the debtor repay
its debt obligations in arrears and in imminent default. It should be kept in
mind that throughout the following discussion, only the general structure of
rescheduling is presented because rescheduling agreements, unlike syndi-
cated agreements, have not yet become standardized.
B. RESCHEDULING MECHANICS
1. Generally
Problem debtors usually have several classes of creditors, all of whom
have different entitlements to the amortization of the borrower's debt. The
classes of creditors to a sovereign borrower, for instance, may include
commercial banks, bondholders, foreign governments, and international
organizations; those of a corporate borrower, commercial banks and
holders of various types of debt securities, including bonds, debentures, and
notes. A problem debtor must usually renegotiate with all classes of credi-
tors, if it must renegotiate with one class. It is the rule that the economic
problems that give rise to the rescheduling of one class will generally apply
to all classes. It is necessary, however, for the problem debtor to negotiate a
separate agreement with each class of creditors, rather than a common
agreement will all classes of external debt. Renegotiations are difficult with
any one class of creditors, let alone all classes of creditors who have widely
diverging interests and expectations.
2. Commercial Bank Rescheduling
The renegotiation of commercial bank debt may involve one or several
groups of commercial banks. When there are several groups of banks,
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usually formed on a national and/or syndicated basis, 14 4 the renegotiation
with the problem debtor will not proceed on a united front. Some groups
drive a harder bargain than others, perhaps ultimately impairing the capac-
ity of the borrower to perform its obligation to any one group, let alone all
groups. Divisive and perhaps as myopic as it seems, the presence of several
groups reflects what its members in their own self-interest regard as the best
institutional vehicle by which to protect their diverse interests in and their
expectations of the debtor's resolution of its problems.
Often, though, only one group of commercial bank creditors is involved in
a renegotiation. At the invitation of the debtor, several major creditors
establish a steering commitee to lead the renegotiation.1 45 Usually no legal
authority vests in the steering committee, though it enjoys the approval of
most commercial banks. The purpose of the steering committee is to achieve
administrative convenience and efficiency in putting together a financial
package which the other banks may or may not accept.
A single bank, called a servicing institution, is responsible for the adminis-
tration of "new money" under a refinancing 146 and the distribution of
receipts under a rescheduling and refinancing if and when the debtor makes
repayment.
3. Type of Debt Rescheduled
There is no general rule as to what type of commercial bank debt is likely
to be rescheduled. As a starting point, only current and imminent arrears
may be rescheduled, the bulk of which is debt arising under several syndi-
cated credits. The reason is often due to circumstances. A debtor faced with
imminent insolvency announces a cut-off date on which a suspension of
payments to creditors will occur, and invites rescheduling negotiations. 147
Creditors recognize the need to reschedule the debt in arrears or in immi-
nent default in order to provide the debtor with some time to reorganize its
financial circumstances and regain its creditworthiness. In the event that the
debtor's problems are likely to be chronic, the creditors may wish to
reschedule all long-term debt. The creditors may recognize that such a
policy is practically difficult. Any fresh debt incurred before the execution of
a rescheduling agreement requires constant revision of the documentation.
In addition, such wholesale rescheduling may be tactically imprudent as
well. The long-term capacity of the debtor to repay its debt may be impaired
because the rescheduling of all debt decreases the debtor's ability to raise
144. Supra note 118, 4-137.
145. Id.
146. Wickersham, Rescheduling of Sovereign Bank Debt, INT'L FIN L. REV. Sept. 1982, at 9.
147. Wood, supra note 118, at 4-116.
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fresh capital during the period between suspension and the execution of the
rescheduling agreement.
4. Rescheduling Methods
There are two general methods by which rescheduling may be
achieved. 148 The first involves the debtor assuming the obligation to repay
the rescheduled amount pursuant to the conditions and terms of the new
agreement concurrent with the creditors discharging the debtor from the
obligation of its old debt to the extent of the rescheduled amount. The
second involves a roll-over in which refinancing loans are used to repay the
amount to be rescheduled.
A rescheduling of multicurrency obligations by whichever method typi-
cally entails a conversion of the debt into a single currency. Conversion
facilitates the administration of the rescheduling agreement by providing a
common base for determining interest periods and pro rata repayment.
Conversion can be controversial, however, as creditors will receive too
much foreign currency relative to their domestic currency, if and when the
debtor can make payments. The forward exchange market offers only an
imperfect hedge against prospective exchange loss because the creditor may
not be able to satisfy a forward contract for its own currency with the foreign
currency paid by the debtor, if the debtor makes infrequent payments due to
its financial difficulties.
5. Creditors Not Consenting to Rescheduling
The creditors who do not agree to the rescheduling agreement are not
bound by its provisions. The obligations of the debtor to and the rights of the
dissenting creditors are governed by the original syndicated loan. Under the
syndication agreement, the dissenting creditors may not be able to acceler-
ate the original debt because banks representing a majority by value can
waive an event of default, namely, the debtor's failure to amortize the loan
as scheduled. The waiver will remain effective in the post-rescheduling
period, however, even if the majority banks release the debtor from the
short-term debt-the majority banks will still have an interest in the unre-
scheduled medium-term debt governed by the original syndicated agree-
ment.
In the event the rescheduling involves refinancing, the dissenting banks
may have a claim in the proceeds of the "new money" under the provision of
the original syndicated loan agreement. These proceeds are technically a
repayment of the old debt, to which pro rata sharing provisions apply.
149
148. Wood, supra note 118, at 4-139.
149. Id.
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C. RESCHEDULING AGREEMENT PROVISIONS
1. Provisions Regarding Debtor and Banks
A rescheduling agreement is not unlike a Eurocurrency syndicated term
loan with respect to many of the provisions it contains. Several of the
provisions, however, such as negative pledge and cross-default and events-
of-default clauses are more finely attuned to the problems of rescheduling in
order to protect the creditors involved in the rescheduling without impairing
the capacity of the debtor to pay. Moreover, new clauses specific to resched-
uling are included so as to protect the interests of the creditor against other
creditors, commercial banks or otherwise.
a. Most-Favored-Debt Clause
An important provision that provides for the pari passu treatment of
commercial bank credits under a rescheduling is the most-favored-debt
clause. Sovereign debtors, for instance, may renegotiate with all their
classes of creditors, if they must renegotiate with the commercial banks. The
clause is drafted in order to prevent another class of creditors under a
separate rescheduling agreement from receiving preferential treatment,
subject to negotiated exceptions. Usually this clause is accompanied by
clauses mandatorily requiring proportionate prepayment of the rescheduled
bank credit, if other rescheduled credit in arrears is paid on more favorable
terms. 150
b. Negative Pledges
A negative pledge prevents the borrower from granting a security interest
in its assets in favor of other creditors. In a rescheduling agreement, its
purpose should be to protect the interests of the commercial banks, without
impairing the capacity of the debtor. As a result, a carefully drafted negative
pledge should distinguish between the normal operations of the debtor and
financial transactions which convey preferential rights over assets or rev-
enues of the debtor to another class of creditors.
In the case of sovereign debtors, the purpose of the negative pledge is to
prevent the preferential diversion of the available foreign currency reserves
and external assets; the only means by which an external debt can be
satisfactorily paid. Since the amounts of foreign currency earnings and
reserves are likely to be very limited when there has been a rescheduling, it is
in the interests of the commercial banks to extend the definition of external
debt to include all foreign currency debt, and not merely debt arising from
the sovereign's loan obligations. 151 Moreover, the negative pledge should
150. Wood, External Governing Law-Fortress or Paper House, INT'L FIN. L. REV. July
1982, at 4.
151. Wood, supra note 118, at 4-145.
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be extended to all instrumentalities of the state so as to prevent the diversion
of foreign currency earnings from these entities, though compromises will
be warranted with respect to central banks.' 52
With respect to both corporate and sovereign debtors, the negative
pledge cannot be made so wide that any security given to a subsequent
creditor would be indiscriminately prohibited. Otherwise, the debtor's nor-
mal operations will be adversely affected. Exceptions must be made to an
extensive negative pledge to accommodate the commercial realities of the
debtor. For instance, sovereign debtors must continue to purchase essential
imports, which may require additional borrowing and some security in the
transaction. 153 In addition to the exceptions enumerated in Part II.B.2.b.i
above, exceptions may include purchase money security interests, security
given under project finance, and security created in export transactions,
such as letters of credit.' 54
In the event the negative pledge does not catch every transaction, the
rescheduling agreement may use the phrase "preferential arrangements of
any kind, the practical effect of which is to create a security interest" to
provide the creditors with some flexibility, though at the cost of inducing
uncertainty with respect to the debtor and the party with which it
transacts. 155
c. Cross-Default
Cross-default clauses found in the normal loan transaction cannot be
adopted without some modification in the rescheduling agreement. The
purpose of the cross-default is to provide banks with the right to accelerate
the loan as soon as it is discovered that other lenders may declare an event of
default. In the context of rescheduling, sensitive cross-default clauses may
not work to the benefit of lenders and debtor, since the debtor is likely to be
in default under a number of agreements. It is better to limit the cross-
default to actual accelerations.' 56 This principle applies even when several
consortia of lenders are involved since in the self-interest of all the creditors,
there is likely to be an uneasy truce regarding acceleration. It typically is not
difficult for these groups to recognize that an acceleration by all groups
would completely destroy the current or prospective creditworthiness of the
debtor, leaving every creditor worse off.
152. A. Pergam, Legal Terms and Conditions: The Borrower's Perspective (Edited text of
remarks prepared for seminar on "Critical Legal Issues-Rescheduling and Default"), Euro-
money International Finance Conference, London, March 16, 1983, at 7.
153. Wickersham, supra note 146, at 9.
154. Wood, supra note 118, at 4-146.
155. Pergam, supra note 152, at 9.
156. Wood, supra note 118, at 4-148.
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d. Events of Default
A rescheduling agreement includes the usual events of default found in
syndicated loan agreements, i.e., non-payment, breach of warranty, mate-
rial adverse changes, and so on. Special events of default are included in
rescheduling agreements with sovereign debtors. These special events are
related to the sovereign debtor's compliance with stringent economic pro-
grams of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which are designed to
improve the creditworthiness of the sovereign. Although the commercial
banks wish to have the sovereign adopt the economic policies of the banks as
a precondition to a rescheduling, the sovereign usually resists these over-
tures as an unacceptable encroachment upon its powers. To circumvent this
objection, the banks incorporate by reference as a positive covenant the
arrangements the sovereign maintains with the IMF. The failure of the
sovereign to comply with these arrangements constitutes an event of de-
fault. As a result, rescheduling agreements, unlike syndicated agreements,
impose very extensive economic controls upon the sovereign debtor.
157
e. Jurisdiction, Forum and Sovereign Immunity
A rescheduling agreement has express provisions requiring the agree-
ment to be governed by foreign law and the debtor to submit to the laws of a
foreign forum. An express waiver of sovereign immunity is required of
sovereign debtors. These waivers are more extensive than those included in
loan agreements governing the original debt. For instance, the U.K. State
Immunity Act, 1978 does not apply retroactively. The original debt predat-
ing the Act will, as a result of the rescheduling, be caught by its provisions,
subjecting more external assets to suit and enforcement under the laws of an
English forum. In addition, more of the sovereign's external assets are
subject to foreign attachment in the event of default on the rescheduling
agreement. Although the original debt may have been incurred by the state
itself or one of its instrumentalities, the inclusion of the state, central bank
and state instrumentalities as joint and several obligors either directly or as
guarantors under the rescheduling agreement has the effect of subjecting
more external assets to foreign suit and enforcement.
58
f. Miscellaneous
The banks require the debtor to provide as much information as possible
so that they are better able to monitor the debtor's performance in improv-
ing its capacity to pay. Debtors, especially sovereign debtors, are sensitive
about disclosing too much information, especially information which must
be prepared specifically for the creditor banks. One approach that provides
157. Id., at 4-144.
158. Id., at 4-142.
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a compromise between these conflicting interests, at least with respect to
sovereign debtors, is providing of reports and information limited to general
data. 159
2. Provisions Regarding Commercial Banks Inter Se
a. Generally
All the banks holding debt eligible for rescheduling may sign the resched-
uling agreement. The agreement becomes binding only when creditors
holding a sufficient threshold of eligible debt, usually at least a simple
majority, have executed or given assent to the agreement. The rescheduling
agreement does not bind those creditors who have not provided their
signatures, though some provision may be made for subsequent accession by
eligible creditors within a specified period.' 60
b. Sharing Clause
The rescheduling agreement provides that the participating banks will
share the receipts obtained under the rescheduling agreement on a pro rata
basis. These receipts include payments by the sovereign debtor and amounts
obtained through the exercise of set-off.
c. Amendments and Waivers:
Unanimity and Majority Rule
A rescheduling agreement usually contains the same rules applying to
amendment and waivers as those found in syndication agreements. Unanim-
ity is required to ratify changes made in the principal amount of the loan
commitment of each creditor, the interest payable, and the amortization
dates and amounts of repayment. A majority vote, usually a simple one, is
required to make an amendment to or waive any provision of the loan not
subject to unanimity. Majority rule, for instance, would apply to waivers of
events of default such as non-payment, non-compliance with covenants, and
inaccuracies in representations and warranties.
Unfortunately, this two-tiered decision-making may lead to impasses
fatal to the rationale underlying the rescheduling agreement. For instance, a
rescheduling agreement may have to be refinanced because the debtor is still
in some financial difficulty, though perhaps not as serious as during the
period prior to the execution of the agreement. A sufficient majority of
banks can waive an event of default and overrule a dissenting minority which
may wish to accelerate the loan and seek suit and enforcement against the
debtor's assets. On the other hand, unanimity is required to refinance the
rescheduling agreement in order to permit the debtor some immediate
relief.
159. Wickersham, supra note 146, at 10.
160. Wood, supra note 118, at 4-141.
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One approach that leads to fewer impasses is to replace the unanimity rule
with a higher majority by value. 161 This would at least allow the banks
engaged in rescheduling greater flexibility in subsequent dealings with a
problem debtor, though those creditors which are only lukewarm to a
rescheduling agreement may not participate due to their prospective loss of
veto power.
3. Provisions Regarding Agents and
Steering Committee
Since the financial problems of the debtor may recur in the course of the
rescheduling agreement, the banks comprising the steering committee and
the bank undertaking the role of the servicing institution insist upon more
extensive protection than that required by syndicate agents. The servicing
institution prefers extensive provisions in the new agreement to limit its
responsibilities to ministerial duties of a mechanical and clerical nature, and
contractually, at least, to exclude potential problems arising from fiduciary
duties. Moreover, it seeks extensive indemnities for damages and costs
incurred in performing these duties.
The banks comprising the steering committee prefer extensive waivers of
liability from other banks regarding that committee's negotiating efforts and
representations, as well as seek indemnities for the expenses incurred in the
renegotiation.
V. Conclusion
Internationally syndicated financial transactions undertaken by commer-
cial banks grew very rapidly in the seventies. The methods of syndication
became routine and the legal provisions governing the rights and duties of
the various parties under a syndicated transaction were standardized. The
rescheduling of sovereign debt in the eighties has blemished somewhat the
rapid growth of syndicated transactions in the seventies. It has been esti-
mated that of the over $700 billion currently owed by the developing and
East bloc countries to commerical banks, governments, 162 and international
financial institutions, $100 billion alone came due and was not paid in
1983.163 Furthermore, the rescheduling of amounts similar to those resched-
uled in 1983 will take place during subsequent years, straining the limits of
the international financial system.
The role of the international financial lawyer is clear. A great deal of legal
and financial innovation will be required to prevent sovereign and corporate
161. Wickersham, supra note 146, at 11.
162. Palmer, The Debt-Bomb Threat, TIME, Jan. 10, 1983, at 32.
163. Francis, Global Analysts Gaze at the Financial Future, TORONTO STAR, May 15, 1983,
at C4.
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borrowers from defaulting on payments of principal and interest, and dis-
rupting, perhaps irreparably, the international financial system. Although
there is some precedent in rescheduling the obligations of sovereign borrow-
ers, and perhaps to a greater extent those of corporate borrowers, resched-
uling techniques and the provisions regulating the rights and duties of
parties to the rescheduling agreement have not become standardized. But
work on and research into the general area of rescheduling syndicated
transactions will not be without its rewards if the challenge of resolving the
current crisis of corporate and sovereign insolvency is to be met.
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